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The number of disconnected youth, those ages 16 to 24 who are not in school 
and are not employed, has reached significant levels in the United States and Western 
Europe. This trend is coupled with the fact that more and more foreign fighters are 
joining Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. In particular, Western 
youth have been the target of radicalization by ISIS and other terrorist groups, and 
the appeal and lure of such groups seem unlikely to subside. A similar trend is 
also evident among youth in Muslim countries where the numbers of foreign 
fighters and terrorist groups seem unlikely to decrease. According to recent estimates, 
over 28,000 foreign fighters have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq since 2011.  
The fact that so many youth have been radicalized to join terrorist groups is a 
cause for concern that requires closer scrutiny, understanding, and action by Western and 
other governments. The explanations and motivations as to why youth join terrorist 
groups abound; these include lack of education, poverty, religion discrimination, family 
background, and political and economic marginalization, among others. This research 
seeks to answer the question, are the youth in the United States, who are disconnected, 
more likely to become radicalized to terrorism? To answer this, various theoretical 
frameworks were researched and examined, such as relative deprivation, social 
movement theory, and psychological perspectives, to shed light on understanding this 
issue.   
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The issue of radicalization of second-generation Muslim youth born in Western 
countries by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and other global terrorist insurgency groups 
has become a major concern from a counter-terrorism policy perspective. Second-
generation Muslim youth tend to struggle with their identity: “they identify as Muslims 
first and second as Europeans.”1 Increasingly, more marginalized second generation 
Muslim western youth are joining the global jihad. In their study of Muslim youth in 
Western Europe and the U.S. radicalized to terrorism, Margarita Bizina and David Gary 
state, “Socially isolated, disenchanted young men turn to extremism in their search for 
identity, acceptance, and purpose which they are unable to find in the community more 
often concerned with wealth accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building.”2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis seeks to determine and investigate which factors may place youth in 
major metropolitan areas at a greater risk of ideological radicalization to terrorism. The 
thesis focuses particularly on the degree of youth disconnection, hypothesizing that 
Muslim youth in major metropolitan areas with higher rates of disconnection are at 
greater risk of radicalization compared to young people in large metropolitan areas with 
lower rates of disconnection. 
More specifically, this study hopes to provide an operational definition of 
radicalization. Moreover, it is also intended to identify and uncover new patterns, themes, 
and relationships between disconnection and radicalization that may be useful to local 
communities, cities, and metropolitan areas in understanding how to identify such 
relationships.  
                                                 
1 Megan. G. Oprea, “Europe’s Fear of ‘Islamophobia’ Led Directly to the Belgium Attacks,” The 
Federalist, March 22, 2016, http://thefederalist.com/2016/03/22/europes-fear-of-islamophobia-led-directly-
to-the-belgium-attacks/.  
2 Margarita Bizina and Gray, H. David, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-
terrorism Policy,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 72.  
 xvi 
Are youth in major U.S. metropolitan areas/cities with high rates of disconnection 
easier targets for ideological radicalization than youth in metropolitan areas with lower 
disconnection rates? 
C. FINDINGS 
The data from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
dealing with county-level correlates of terrorism is helpful in refining our understanding. 
The START study by LaFree and Bersani found evidence of terrorism at the county level 
and that terrorist attacks cluster in specific geographic areas.3 Specifically, their findings 
show that 25 percent of  
all attacks occurred in just 10 counties. Manhattan, NY experienced the 
highest number of attacks during this time (n = 30), followed by Los 
Angeles County, CA (n = 19), San Diego County, CA (n = 16), 
Washington, DC (n = 15), and Miami Dade County, FL (n = 14).4  
However, smaller counties, such as Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Tulsa County, 
Oklahoma; and Lane County, Oregon, have also been targets of terrorism attacks.5 The 
START study by LaFree and Bersani offers the following geographic profile of what a 
“typical” U.S. county looks like that has experienced a terrorist attack for the period 
1990–2010:6 
• a larger population  
• more young men aged 15 to 24 years  
• a greater proportion of Asian, Hispanic, and foreign-born residents  
• higher rates of language diversity7 
This profile offered by START is extremely helpful in trying to understand all the 
characteristics that lead to terrorism. However, the study observed a shift in the profile 
                                                 
3 Gary LaFree and Bianca Bersani, County-level Correlates of Terrorism in the United States, 1990 to 
2010 (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
2013).  
4 Ibid., 2.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
 xvii 
from attacks in the 1990s as compared to those counties that experienced an attack from 
2001–2010. The researchers explained, “2001 to 2010 had smaller proportions of males 
aged 15 to 24 years, higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, greater proportions of 
foreign-born citizens, and higher rates of language diversity.”8 The study is careful not to 
suggest that terrorist attacks are more likely undertaken by youth who are poor, speak a 
foreign language, and are foreign-born.9 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis outlines theories such as relative deprivation, social movement theory, 
social distance theory, consolidated inequality theory, and psychological frameworks to 
understand the motivations for radicalization. In addition, it also explores disconnection 
as an occurrence through the prism of education, unemployment, underemployment, and 
employment to examine root causes of how they diverge and intersect at a macro level. 
This research confirms the finding from other research studies that radicalized youth and 
individuals and those involved in terrorism do not necessarily lack education or come 
from low income family backgrounds. One of the central themes for future research 
emerging from this research is the concept of “frustrated achiever” and how it may affect 
youth with education and without education in terms of radicalization. In considering 
radicalization to terrorist groups, when combining insights from the existing literature, it 
appears that a collective anger based on perceived injustices to and alienation of one’s 
group may be a source of radicalization.  
The recommendations of this thesis are listed not in order of importance but in 
order of action needed for consideration. Focused attention is required to address the 
issue of radicalization of youth and should consist of integration points at various levels 
within the United States. Despite the fact that this study did not find a relationship 
between youth disconnection and radicalization in large metropolitan areas, it does not 
preclude this from becoming an issue in the future. Indeed, future research on “frustrated 
achievers” and representative radicalism may find such a linkage.  
                                                 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank my advisor, Professor Anne Clunan, for her unwavering 
support, guidance, wisdom, counsel, and patience during this process. Her expertise, 
knowledge, and demonstration of the subject matter have been invaluable. I would also 
like to thank Dr. Nadav Morag, who served as a reader for this thesis. Their support was 
an enormous help, and I could not have finished this project without them.  
I also want to express my gratitude to the DHS, TSA and the Office of Human 
Capital for allowing me to pursue such an enriching and rewarding educational 
experience. Since I started this educational experience 18 months ago, the professors, 
instructors, and faculty have been superb. The dissemination of knowledge, academic 
rigor, educational experience, and intellectual stimulation have been very enriching and 
rewarding. The members of cohort 1503 and 1504 have my utmost respect, admiration, 
and appreciation. I can say without hesitation that I have made friends for life.  
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support 
and belief in me. My wife, Unity, has been my biggest cheerleader and supporter. 
Without her love, support, encouragement, and prayers, I could not have completed this 
journey. Her reassurance and unfailing “you can do this” attitude is what kept me going. 
To my children, Courtney, John Aaron, and Ashley, I want to give a special “shout-
out”—you reminded me every day of how proud, blessed, and privileged I am to be your 
father. Thank you for allowing me to undertake this wonderful educational endeavor.  
 xx 




The British MI5 warned in 2007 that Al Qaeda and its affiliates were 
seeking to radicalize children as young as 15 into mounting terror attacks 
in the United Kingdom. In like vein, the former Director of the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency warned that Al Qaeda was seeking to 
radicalize western youth for the purpose of mounting terror attacks in the 
West. Some estimates suggest that youth between 15 and 18 years of age 
comprise 20 percent of all suicide bombers (Samuel, 2011: 109–113). As 
we shall see, youth are particularly susceptible to radicalization into 
violent extremism of the ISIS and similar ills, for a variety of reasons. 
Rama Krishna, February 11, 2016 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
From a counter-terrorism policy perspective, the issue of radicalization by Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other global terrorist insurgency groups of second-
generation Muslim youth born in Western countries has become a major concern. First-
generation Muslims in Europe and probably in other Western nations often still retain ties 
with the birth country and often find it difficult to integrate and learn the new norms and 
cultural nuances. Second-generation Muslim youth, on the other hand, tend to struggle 
with their identity: “they identify as Muslims first and second as Europeans.”1 
Increasingly, more marginalized second-generation Muslim Western youth are joining 
the global jihad. In their study of Muslim youth in Western Europe and the United States 
radicalization to terrorism, Margarita Bizina and David Gary state, “Socially isolated, 
disenchanted young men turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance, and 
purpose which they are unable to find in the community more often concerned with 
wealth accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building.”2  
                                                 
1 Megan. G. Oprea, “Europe’s Fear of ‘Islamophobia’ Led Directly to the Belgium Attacks,” The 
Federalist, March 22, 2016, http://thefederalist.com/2016/03/22/europes-fear-of-islamophobia-led-directly-
to-the-belgium-attacks/.  
2 Margarita Bizina and Gray, H. David, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-
terrorism Policy,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 72–79.  
 2 
The general perception among second-generation Muslim youth (whether born as 
a Muslim or those converted to Islam) is that material things in Western society are 
valued over building relationships, and this makes them feel socially marginalized. Many 
of them have never traveled to the birthplace or country of their parents, have no regional 
or ethnic identity, and often do not speak the language of their parents’ birthplace, nor 
have they ever traveled; however, and they do not feel welcomed in their new home 
country in the West. All of these factors can contribute to, and possibly lead to, 
radicalization among certain groups of Western youth who may experience such personal 
conflict. The only identity these second generation have left is their religion to some 
degree, which makes them more likely targets to become radicalized. 
In late 2014, according to a CIA assessment and as reported by CNN, the 
estimated number of foreign, or international fighters in Syria was believed to be more 
than 15,000.3 In 2015, the number of foreign or international fighters reportedly 
increased by about 100 percent to approximately 30,000.4 According to intelligence 
estimates from the United States, the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq peaked 
in 2015; however, those numbers have since come down. It is believed that about one-
third of these foreign fighters come from Western Europe, and the number of U.S. 
fighters is believed to be about 250, up from the 2014 estimate of about 100 fighters.5 
Trends similar to these are seen with the youth of other European countries who are 
joining ISIS in Syria. Despite efforts by Western governments to prevent their youth from 
joining ISIS, the internet and social media continue to be used as tools to recruit and 
radicalize young people in Western societies. 
Though the number of U.S. fighters in Syria appears to be relatively small as 
compared to other Western countries, it has the potential to become a significant 
homeland security threat if it is not acknowledged, understood, and addressed. Experts 
                                                 
3 Jim Sciutto, Crawford, Jamie, and Carter Chelsea, “ISIS Can ‘Muster’ between 20,000 and 31,500 
Fighters, CIA Says,” CNN, September 12, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-
iraq.  
4 “Number of Foreign Fighters in Syria Has Doubled in Past Year—Report,” Russia Today (RT), 
September 27, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/316644-jihadists-flow-double-syria/.  
5 Ibid.  
 3 
argue that growing mistrust and negative opinion about their government’s foreign policy 
is a major driver for Western youth joining ISIS and other terrorist groups.6 Other 
factors, such as political, economic, and social marginalization, are also important factors 
to keep in mind, as demonstrated in this study. Many or all of the fighters from the 
United States and Western Europe also carry passports of their home countries, and this 
poses a unique set of terrorism issues and challenges. The argument is that the enemy is 
“already in the country by birth or naturalization.”7 Law enforcement agencies from 
Western governments must pay close attention to “civil liberties and extremism 
propaganda.”8  
According to FBI Director James Comey, “ISIS terrorist cells are now active in 
all 50 U.S. states.”9 This assessment by the FBI director is a reminder that the threat is 
real and serves as a telltale sign that more should be done to understand the reasons and 
motivations why youth join terrorist groups, and if there is a nexus between 
disconnection and radicalization. Disconnection refers to youth who are not involved in 
education and not employed. It is the intent and purpose of this thesis to explore the 
relationship between disconnection and radicalization among U.S. youth in some of the 
major metropolitan areas in depth as well as to understand the nature and the major 
underpinnings of this relationship.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The central question driving this research study is: What are the root causes that 
lead to radicalization in U.S. youth ages 16 to 24? This study examines alternative 
explanations for youth radicalization to assess which factors are most important in youth 
radicalization. This research focuses specifically on arguments about the socioeconomic 
status of American youth: their socioeconomic position, their degree of educational 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  
7 Bizina and David, “Radicalization of Youth,” 72.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Chuck Goudie, “ISIS Present in All 50 States, FBI Director Says,” ABC 7 News Chicago, February 
25, 2015, http://abc7chicago.com/news/isis-present-in-all-50-states-fbi-director-says/534732/.  
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attainment, their socioeconomic integration or marginalization, and their overall level of 
connection with or disconnection from social and economic institutions.  
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis seeks to determine and investigate which factors may place youth in 
major metropolitan areas at a greater risk of ideological radicalization to terrorism. The 
thesis focuses particularly on the degree of youth disconnection, hypothesizing that 
Muslim youth in major metropolitan areas with higher rates of disconnection are at 
greater risk of radicalization compared to young people in large metropolitan areas with 
lower rates of disconnection.  
More specifically, this study hopes to provide an operational definition of 
radicalization. Moreover, it is also intended to identify and uncover new patterns, themes, 
and relationships between disconnection and radicalization that may be useful to local 
communities, cities, and metropolitan areas in understanding how to identify such 
relationships.  
U.S. policy makers, especially the congressional Homeland Security Committee 
and other committees with homeland security or intelligence oversight, will find the 
study useful to ensure proper funding, oversight, and policies related to counter-
radicalization programs are developed and implemented at the federal and state levels. 
The federal government especially the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
FBI, and other federal government stakeholders are interested in understanding the 
triggers and motivators at the local metropolitan areas/cities that lead to radicalization. To 
also ensure that proper focus, attention, resources, community partnership, and 
collaboration mechanisms should be considered and implemented.  
State and local governments will have a better understanding of how to act with 
respect to radicalization once the relationship between disconnection and radicalization is 
better understood. Collaboration, trust, and transparency are critical to federal and state 
partners and agencies, local law enforcement, and tribal entities as well as community 
leaders to find common ground and practical solutions to the radicalization problem. 
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D. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
Studying radicalization, in particular the ideology and beliefs of individuals, is 
highly complex and subjective. Understanding the thinking and beliefs, as well the 
narratives resulting in terrorist acts are not always clear, and the motivations and drivers 
that fuels terrorist violence is even less clearly defined.10 The study of radicalization is 
highly contested, which leaves it open to challenges, interpretation, and 
misunderstanding. The research of this study is an attempt to move the needle on the 
subject just a little bit and to add to the political, socioeconomic, public discourse while 
understanding the causes that give rise to radicalization. 
The goal of this research is to shed light on the social, economic, and political 
factors that may cause disconnection leading to radicalization among 16- to 24-year-old 
individuals in metropolitan areas. This age group is the more disconnected as compared 
to other age groups in the United States and has been found to be more sympathetic to 
terrorist groups compared to other age groups in Britain.11 In the United States, in 
particular, this age group appears to be most vulnerable and at risk given high 
disconnection rates as outlined below. This thesis examines the role of factors such as 
family background, socioeconomic conditions, income levels, access to education, 
religious affiliation, race, ethnicity, and gender for both disconnection and radicalization. 
This research study’s purpose is to investigate and understand if the factors related to the 
disconnection among youth are the same factors that lead youth to be radicalized. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study seeks to investigate and answer the research questions that follow.  
                                                 
10 Change Institute, Studies into Violent Radicalization; Lot 2—The Beliefs Ideologies and Narratives 
(London: Change Institute, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/ 
docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology_and_narrative_en.pdf.  
11 “British-born, Rich, and Isolated Muslims More Likely to be Radicalized—Study,” Russia Times 
(RT), September 25, 2014, https://www.rt.com/uk/190588-british-depressed-muslims-radicalized/.  
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(1) Primary Research Question 
Are youth in major U.S. metropolitan areas/cities with high rates of disconnection 
easier targets for ideological radicalization than youth in metropolitan areas with lower 
disconnection rates? The hypothesis for this primary research question is that youth 
between the ages of 16 to 24 in metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection are 
more likely to be radicalized compared to youth in metropolitan areas with lower rates of 
disconnection.  
(2) Secondary Research Question 
Which societal factors and influencers are the leading causes of radicalization 
among youth in metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection? The hypothesis for 
this secondary research question is that youth race and religious ideology (especially 
jihadist) are major drivers of youth radicalization to terrorist groups such as ISIS. 
F. METHODS 
The methods of conducting the research consist of two parts, quantitative and 
qualitative. Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses for this study rely on secondary 
data from the New America Foundation on terrorism in the United States after 9/11 up to 
September 2016, as well as other data. The data is broken down by foreign or domestic 
(U.S.) attacks and ideology (right wing or jihadist), and it includes about 30 variables 
listed in Appendix A. First, this thesis includes an analysis of the descriptive statistics to 
provide a context for the data and the hypothesis and purpose of this research. Second, 
the thesis measures the extent of radicalization after September 11, 2001, by looking at 
the number of individuals killed, the number of victims wounded, and the number of 
terrorist attacks. While there is no meaningful measure of radicalization as a construct 
currently, these three dependent indicators provide a useful attempt to quantify it. The 
data from New America in itself cannot meaningfully measure radicalization directly, so 
a combination of these key indicators was used to draw out the hidden variable of 
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radicalization.12 From an analysis standpoint, this study compares averages, means, and 
modes and uses cross-break tables to report the data as it relates to age, ethnicity, gender, 
and other variables.  
The qualitative data for this research comes from numerous secondary data 
sources, including the George Washington University Program on Extremism, the 
Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) data from START at the 
University of Maryland, and the research of John Mueller at the Ohio State University. 
Data from the National Institute of Justice supplements these sources to provide a 
complete picture based on recent, reliable, contextually applicable, accessible, and open 
source data of the psychological, environment, political, and social factors in the United 
States. The research for this thesis is rooted in grounded social science.  
This study includes an extensive literature review of youth radicalization. The 
literature review includes scholarship on radicalization of young people in Muslim 
countries, Western Europe, and the United States to understand the reasons, motivations, 
and underlying assumptions why they are radicalized and join terrorist groups. The 
literature review also highlights significant ethnic, religious, cultural, social, political, and 
institutional similarities and differences that helped shape and refine the research 
questions, hypothesis, and assumptions.  
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One can group the literature into two predominant schools of thought as to why 
youth are radicalized and are joining ISIS. On the one hand, “there are those who believe 
ideology, culture and religion are the primary drivers.”13 These studies suggest that the 
reasons why Western Muslim youth are radicalized are because of the involvement of the 
West in an unjust war in Syria and the Middle East (they see this as an assault on their 
                                                 
12 Gary LaFree, Kathleen Smarick, and Shira Fishman, Community-level Indicators of Radicalization: 
A Data and Measurement Workshop (Washington, DC: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism, 2010), http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/community-level-
indicators-radicalization-data-and-measurement-workshop.  
13 Ömer Taşpınar, “You Can’t Understand Why People Join ISIS without Understanding Relative 
Deprivation,” World Post, March 15, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amer-tapaenar-/isis-relative-
deprivation_b_6912460.html.  
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Muslim values and identity), the desecration of the Prophet Mohammed, which resulted 
in Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, among reasons.14 The other view contends that “social 
and economic factors trump ideology and religion. Lack of education, unemployment, 
poverty and the absence of upward mobility causes a growing sense of frustration and 
radicalization.”15 The authors focus on lack of social integration,16 lack of economic 
participation, social isolation, exclusion, and being viewed as second class citizens.17 
Both views are important since they both lead to the same outcome despite different 
drivers that fuel them—disconnected and marginalized youth, who are pushed to the 
societal edges and who have pledged allegiance to jihad because the society in which 
they live ignores them. Therefore, they have become easy targets for radicalization. Yet 
another group of scholars highlight psychological causes that may stem from either 
cultural or socioeconomic sources, arguing that those radicalized are thrill seekers, 
identity seekers, revenge seekers, or status seekers.18 It is apparent from this brief survey 
that the reasons why Western youth, especially Western Muslim youth, become 
radicalized and join terrorist groups are varied. A deeper study of the literature on 
radicalization and terrorism appears in the next chapter.  
While the literature on terrorism seems to concur there is hardly any connection 
between poverty and radicalization, some academics and journalists assert that there is a 
causal relationship between disconnection and radicalization. According to Margarita 
Bizina and David Gary, “Socially isolated, disenchanted young men turn to extremism in 
their search for identity, acceptance, and purpose which they are unable to find in the 
community more often concerned with wealth accumulation rather than healthy 
                                                 
14 Syed Kamall, “What Drives Young Muslims to Radicalization. Many Elders Understand We Can 
Both be European and Muslim. Now We Need to Teach Our Children How,” Wall Street Journal, February 
5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/syed-kamall-what-drives-young-muslims-to-radicalization-
1423169290.  
15 Ibid.  
16 William Wolfberg, “The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization in the 
United States and Europe” (master’s thesis, University of South Florida, 2012), 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4421.  
17 Bizina and David, “Radicalization of Youth,” 72–79.  
18 John M. Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda? (Special Report 236) (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2010), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf.  
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relationship-building.”19 It is the socioeconomic context of these young men that leads 
them to search for an ideology, religion, or culture to give them a positive identity. A 
general perception among second-generation Muslim youth (whether born as a Muslim or 
those converted to Islam), and often the reality, is that Western society values material 
things over building relationships.20 Thus, they may seek a culture or identity that is non-
Western. Jon-Christopher Bua asserts that African-American and Muslim youth in 
America are two groups that are both disconnected in society for many of the same 
reasons.21 There is a possible connection between Muslim youth and African American 
youth because they are the racial groups experiencing the highest conversion rate to 
Islam, as is shown in a later chapter. The central theme regarding youth disconnection 
requires further examination and inquiry to understand the underlying reasons for such 
occurrence. Disconnection is one of the key variables that this thesis investigates. 
H. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
This thesis consists of six sections. Chapter II provides an overview of the 
seminal literature on radicalization and explores the concept of radicalization from an 
individual and group perspectives to shed light on the definitional paradoxes in the 
literature. It builds on the various definitions found in the literature to offer its own 
definition of radicalization and disconnection to examine whether there is a connection 
between the two. Chapter II then provides a foundation and theoretical perspectives of 
relative deprivation, psychological motivations, social movement, social distance, and 
consolidated inequality theories and frameworks to understand disconnection and 
radicalization.  
Chapter III offers a demographic overview of youth disconnection in the United 
States followed by a deeper dive into what the youth disconnection profile looks like in 
some of the metropolitan areas in the United States. It also shows that the education 
participation level and dropout rates serve as important indicators of youth participation. 
                                                 
19 Bizina and David, “Radicalization of Youth,” 72.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Jon-Christopher Bua, “Disaffected Youth Open to Exploitation,” Talk Radio Service News, June 8, 
2015, http://www.talkradionews.com/opinion/2015/06/08/disaffected-youth-open-to-exploitation.html.  
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Additionally, this chapter examines youth unemployment, underemployment, and 
employment to shed light on the issue of youth disconnection to provide meaning and 
context and to help frame the issue. Chapter III builds a bridge between disconnection 
and radicalization and serves as an important building block for the rest of the chapters.  
Chapters IV focuses on radicalization of youth to terrorism by looking at the issue 
in Muslim countries, Western Europe, and the United States, in particular, to frame the 
nature and scope of the issue. Chapter V provides as quantitative statistical analysis to 
examine and explore the relationship between radicalization and disconnection. Finally, 
Chapter VI provides a summary of the findings. It offers some recommendations and 
steps that can be implemented and taken in the United States to mitigate the potential 
threat and to decrease the risk of radicalization within the youth population ages 16 to 24, 
broadly, and within Muslim youth, more specifically.  
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 RADICALIZATION TO TERRORISM IN THE LITERATURE  II.
And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the 
United States. Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, a 
plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 
people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America has confronted 
many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated 
individuals—often U.S. citizens or legal residents—can do enormous 
damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. And 
that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort 
Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon. 
President Barack Obama 
National Defense University in Washington, DC 
May 23, 2013 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism and political violence are not new societal issues. Globally, terrorism 
has increased since 9/11 and the amount of research on the topic has subsequently grown 
significantly.22 The central question of this thesis is, “Are Muslim youth in major U.S. 
metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection at a greater risk of radicalization than 
those in areas with lower rates?” Radicalization to terrorism does not occur in a void. 
This thesis argues that connecting the structural—social, economic, political—and 
psychological factors that lead to terrorism provides critical linkage to understanding 
individual behaviors. An understanding of the economic, “social and political conditions 
that make terrorism more likely” than in other circumstances forms an integral part of the 
discussion.23 The hypothesis investigated in this thesis starts with the assumption, 
detailed in the next chapter, that many young people feel disconnected from their society, 
meaning that they lack educational and economic opportunities. They also experience 
relative deprivation—a feeling of dissatisfaction people have stemming from the fact that 
                                                 
22 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Background Report: 
9/11, Ten Years Later (Washington, DC: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2011), https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/BackgroundReport_ 
10YearsSince9_11.pdf.  
23 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–399.  
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they perceive that they have less than what they should and could have. This 
dissatisfaction results from feeling disconnected from one’s society and over time leads 
to frustration, which ultimately may result in violence. Critically, young people need not 
be personally lacking education or income to feel disconnected. They may feel 
representatively disconnected, wherein their grievance is felt on behalf of a larger group. 
To answer the research questions and evaluate this argument requires drawing on the 
existing body of knowledge regarding both the meaning and causes of radicalization to 
terrorism. 
B. DEFINING RADICALIZATION  
There is no universally accepted definition of radicalization in the literature on 
terrorism studies or in the homeland security arena. Lorenzo Vidino states that 
disagreement runs deep, and in some instances, scholars emphasize “structural factors 
[that] due to political tensions and cultural cleavages are trigger events causing 
radicalization, while others emphasize personal factors, such as the shock of a life-
changing event or the influence of a mentor.”24 It is also likely that there will never be an 
agreed upon definition.25 The term radicalization has been in existence for “over a 
century in the United States, and has been applied to groups or populations perceived as 
politically marginal or ideologically threatening.”26 Many scholars of radicalization 
emphasize the importance of an individual’s prior identification with a group or cause 
before radicalization occur, yet they are vague about whether radicalization entails 
engaging in violence. In their definition of radicalization, McCauley and Moskalenko 
                                                 
24 Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in the America. Lessons from Europe (Special Report 
262 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR262%20-
%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf, 3.  
25 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36.  
26 Jonathan J. Edwards, “Figuring Radicalization: Congressional Narratives of Homeland Security and 
American Muslim Communities,” Journal Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (2015): 
102–120, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2014.996168.  
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note movement of “beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify 
intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group.”27  
Other academics and government agencies explicitly make violence an integral 
part of radicalization in their definitions.28 For example, the FBI inherently associates 
radicalization with violence in that those committing violence justify it with some social 
or political agenda.29 This is very similar to the Danes, who, however, put the adjective 
“violent” in front of radicalization to distinguish it from nonviolent radicals.30 However, 
the British and the Dutch do not equate radicalization with violence in their official 
definitions. It is apparent that state intelligence agencies view and define radicalization 
based on their unique country perspective and that they do not agree or use a common 
definition and approach. Even though these definitions are important to the context and 
environment in which they are used, they fall short in that they do not address the 
socioeconomic factors that often forms the root causes of radicalization, especially as it 
relates to youth.  
Citing the work of Veldhuis and Stein, Randy Borum states, “any useful 
framework must be able to integrate mechanisms at the micro (individual) and macro 
                                                 
27 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2008): 416.  
28 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I,” 7. This work by Borum provides and lays out 
the various definitions on radicalization from an academic standpoint and includes definitions by 
governments.  
29 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I.” Borum reviews governments define 
radicalization in its context of counter-terrorism strategy. According to Borum, the United Kingdom’s 
Home Office refers to radicalization simply as: “The process by which people come to support terrorism 
and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups.” Borum reports that the Dutch 
Security Service (AIVD) on the other hand defines radicalization as a “Growing readiness to pursue and/or 
support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a 
threat to, the democratic order.” Finally, Borum also related that the Danish Intelligence Service (PET) 
focuses on “violent radicalization,” and defines it as, “a process by which a person to an increasing extent 
accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific 
political/ideological objective.” The FBI on the other hand defines radicalization as, “the process by which 
individuals come to believe their engagement in or facilitation of non-state violence to achieve social and 
political change is necessary and justified.” Ryan Hunter and Daniel Henke, “Perspective Radicalization of 
Islamist Terrorists in the Western World,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2011, 
https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/perspective-radicalization-of-islamist-terrorists-in-the-western-world.  
30 Ibid.  
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(societal/cultural) levels.”31 The different existing theoretical frameworks on 
radicalization underscore its complex nature and cannot fit within a “cookie cutter” or 
uniform approach that is often neatly wrapped. To that end, this study proposes its own 
definition of radicalization that incorporates these levels. 
Radicalization for the purpose of this study is defined as a process whereby an 
individual or a group chooses to adopt, internalize, and act on a new ideology or set of 
beliefs aimed at challenging the prevailing social, economic, political, and status quo 
with or without violent outcomes. This definition draws on the existing literature on 
radicalization to emphasize and integrate some of its key insights: that radicalization 
occurs both at the individual and group level and is a process. It takes the position that 
radicalization entails acting on a set of beliefs, not merely holding them, and those acts 
may or may not be violent ones. This definition goes beyond the ones found in the 
literature because it considers the social, economic, political, and religious environments 
that are often missing or overlooked in many definitions but are critical influencers, 
which should not be ignored.  
While the focus of this thesis is on Muslim youth in the United States, it is worth 
emphasizing that adopting and holding Islamist radical ideas are not illegal acts; 
however, the intention to engage and engaging in violent acts is illegal, and this 
distinction is an important part of the literature review and this study.32 In their research, 
Jordan and Boix highlight a few themes common to radical Islamist ideologies, including 
shifting all blame for Islam’s problems to the West, adopting anti-democratic policies, 
and supporting terrorism acts directly or indirectly.33 Islamic radicalization can be 
considered on two levels: (1) where violence is used to seek a particular outcome, 
                                                 
31 Tinka Veldhuis and J. Staun, Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model (The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009).  
32 Defense Human Resource Activity, “Terrorism 101: The Radicalization Process,” accessed October 
15, 2016, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/osg/terrorism/terrorism-101.htm#Terrorism 101.  
33 Javier Jordan and Luisa Boix, “Al-Qaeda and Western Islam,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 
no. 1 (2004): 1–17, doi 10.1080/09546550490445983.  
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violence is seen as the only means to reach an objective, and (2) societal change is 
desired and sought but violence is not the primary driver to affect the necessary change.34  
It is imperative at this point to distinguish between Islamist and jihadist ideology. 
According to the BBC, 
Islamists aim to reorder government and society in accordance with 
Islamic law, or Sharia. Jihadists see violent struggle as necessary to 
eradicate obstacles to restoring God’s rule on Earth and defending the 
Muslim community, or umma, against infidels and apostates.35  
In an article he wrote, Daniel Pipes also echoed a similar theme about the “antagonism of 
Islam toward non-Muslims.”36 Pipes specifically indicates that the goal of Islamism is “to 
turn Islam, a religion and civilization, into an ideology.”37 This distinction is an 
important one and is key to this study’s definition of radicalization. Not all Islamists use 
violence, whereas jihadists usually do. Becoming a terrorist is a gradual development but 
exactly how that occurs is still not clearly understood.  
C. CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION 
Martha Crenshaw’s seminal work on the causes of terrorism is the model many 
use to outline and describe root causes of radicalization. Many as a model to outline and 
describe root causes of radicalization have used the seminal work of Martha Crenshaw on 
the causes of terrorism.38 Crenshaw notes that there is a theoretical framework for 
various types and causes of terrorism.39 Additionally, she states that we must consider the 
environment in which terrorism occurs and that not everyone who holds the same views 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 12.  
35 “What is Jihadism,” BBC, December 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
30411519.  
36 Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism.” Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, June 30, 1998, http://www.danielpipes.org/954/distinguishing-between-islam-and-islamism.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Matthew Francis, “What Causes Radicalization? Main Lines of Consensus in Recent Research,” 
Radicalization Research, January 24, 2012, http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/francis-2012-
causes-2/.  
39 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.”  
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as a terrorist group does participates in or is involved in terrorism.40 Within Crenshaw’s 
framework, the causes of terrorism are grouped into three major categories: situational 
variables, the strategy of the terrorist organization, and ideological or individual 
participation.41 This thesis focuses on two of the three: the impact that situational or 
structural variables and individual-level variables have on radicalization. 
Within the situational category, Crenshaw draws a distinction between what are 
called preconditions, “(those factors that set the stage for terrorism in the long run) and 
precipitants (specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism).”42 
Moreover, Crenshaw breaks down preconditions into enabling (known as trigger events) 
and motivating factors (or elements that inspire terrorism).43 Precipitants on the other 
hand are viewed as being very similar to direct causes of terrorism.44 The discussion now 
turns to the several of these situational and individual variables. 
1. Modernity  
Modernity is identified as a precondition for terrorism. Francis makes the 
argument that, “the presence of the internet, mass transit, and urbanization all bring 
people closer together, allowing for swift movements of individuals and ideas.”45 
However, the opposite is also true: modernity can also leave a large segment of the 
population and groups of people behind because of lack of access to the means that 
connect people and individuals. This can have a marginalizing effect. This has led to a 
focus on socioeconomic conditions that promote radicalization, and chief among them are 
“poverty and lack of social mobility through educational and economic opportunities.”46 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 381.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Francis, “What Causes Radicalization?”  
46 Ibid.  
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2. Poverty and Marginalization 
Poverty and the lack of economic opportunity are key factors that may directly or 
indirectly be associated with violence or terrorism.47 At a March 2002 development 
summit in Monterey, California, President George W. Bush made the statement, “We 
fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror,” which has since been used as 
confirmation that poverty causes terrorism.48 The case for and against poverty and 
socioeconomic factors as igniters of terrorism abound in the literature.49Poverty as a 
predictor of radicalization has been researched by various scholars, who have argues it is 
not a sole cause.50 Some studies have repeatedly sought to debunk the idea that poverty 
and the lack of education cause terrorism. In this view, terrorism is not just a third or 
developing-world issue where poverty and social inequality are prevalent. Social factors, 
such as terrorist ideology, westernization and modernization, religious fundamentalism, 
group or psychological factors, and a host of others, can all have contributing influences 
on radicalization to terrorism.51  
The research finding against poverty and lack of education as causes has been 
corroborated by recently leaked ISIS documents, which show the average foreign fighter 
to be “young, well well-educated but only possess a rudimentary understanding of 
                                                 
47 Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009); Lorena Cohan, Beth Mayberry, Gustavo Payan, and 
John Rosiak, Understanding Youth Crime and Violence in Honduras: Summary Report Findings (Boston: 
Education Development Center, 2014), http://idd.edc.org/sites/idd.edc.org/files/Understanding%20Youth 
%20Crime%20and%20Violence%20in%20Honduras%20-%20Summary%20Report%20Findings.pdf.  
48 “Remarks by Mr. George W. Bush, U.S. President at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, Monterrey, Mexico March 22, 2002,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/ffd/ 
statements/usaE.htm.  
49 James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social 
Cleavage,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–177; Alan Krueger and Jitka 
Malečková, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–144.  
50 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide (New York: 
Routledge: 2009).  
51 Caroline F. Ziemke, “Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing 
to Terrorism,” in “In the Same Light as Slavery:” Building a Global Antiterrorim Consensus, ed. Joseph 
McMillian, 97–127 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/global_at_consensus.pdf.  
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Islam.”52 Terrorism is not considered to be the preferred choice of the poor masses, but 
rather the preference of a select few, if we accept the terrorism research in this regard. As 
stated by Helena Roy, “the educated individual becomes willing to pursue a political 
grievance through violence when there are few alternatives available.”53 In a study 
conducted by Krueger and Maleĉková, they “found that terrorist recruits tend to have 
relatively high levels of education and wealth.”54 In addition, John M. Venhaus states 
that the rhetoric of poverty is simply that—recruits do not come from the poor masses.55 
Moreover, Mehmet Fevzi Dörtbudak, citing the work of Mark Sageman, notes, the “vast 
majority of terrorists come from the middle class, which suggests that poverty is not the 
primary cause of terrorism.”56  
However, others insist that there is a relationship between economic 
marginalization and radicalization. In his work on Islamist radicalism in Central Asia, 
Ahmed Rashid found a relationship between youth unemployment and radicalization.57 
In his work on radicalization among Palestinian youth, Halil Khashan echoes a very 
similar finding.58 According to anecdotal evidence from a variety of countries, “poverty 
does bear on terrorist activity and cannot be overlooked.”59  
                                                 
52 Lizzie Deardan, “ISIS Documents Leak Reveals Profile of Average Militant as Young, Well-
educated but with Only ‘Basic’ Knowledge of Islamic Law,” Independent, April 21, 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-documents-leak-reveals-profile-of-average-
militant-as-young-well-educated-but-with-only-basic-a6995111.html.  
53 Helena Roy, “Where Education and Wealth Fails: Demystifying the Causes of Terrorism,” 
Cambridge Globalist, October 19, 2014, http://cambridgeglobalist.org/2014/10/19/education-wealth-fails-
demystifying-causes-terrorism/.  
54 Krueger and Malečková, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism.”  
55 Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda?  
56 Mehmet Fevzi Dörtbudak, “The Intelligence Requirements of Psychological Operations in 
Counterterrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008).  
57 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 
2002).  
58 Hilal Khashan, “Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings,” Third World Quarterly 
24, no. 6 (1995): 1049–1067.  
59 Ibid., 44.  
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3. Individual Factors 
According to Matthew Francis, “individual factors constantly emerge as 
unpredictable elements, which foil any attempt to predict who will resort to violence, and 
which prevents the attempts of so-called theories of radicalization to accurately account 
for violent behavior—other than in retrospect.”60 Understanding the predispositions and 
reasons why individuals join and participate in terrorism is complex, and there are no 
easy answers. Factors, such as background, psychological mindset, discrimination, 
relative deprivation, are important factors that should considered, but the influence of 
these can also vary from one individual to another. However, sociological and 
psychological approaches examining why people engage in social mobilization and 
violence can shed light on why individuals are open to radicalization. 
The next sections examine several theories—relative deprivation, social 
movement theory, social distance theory, and psychological theories. These are reviewed 
with an eye to further unpacking radicalization at the individual and group levels and how 
social, economic, political factors, interacting with ideological and cultural factors, can 
lead to radicalized youth willing to commit violence.  
a. Relative Deprivation Theory  
When trying to explain why men rebel, Ted Robert Gurr found that mass 
discontent stemming from a gap between expected and achieved wellbeing results in 
political violence.61 Relative deprivation theory has its roots in the work of sociologist, 
Samuel A. Stouffer.62 The central concept posited by the theory of relative deprivation is 
that groups of people or individuals experience deprivation when their present 
circumstances (economic, political, social etc.) are “negatively compared” to the situation 
of others.63 According to Gurr, “Relative deprivation refers to the tension that develops 
between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, that disposes men to 
                                                 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).  
62 Simone, I. Flynn, “Social Movement Theory: Relative Deprivation Theory,” in Sociology Reference 
Guide. Theories of Social Movements, ed. Salem Press editors (Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press, 2011), 102.  
63 Ibid., 108. 
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violence.”64 The literature on relative deprivation focusing on social exclusion and social 
movements is very extensive, well researched, and provides a convincing foundation for 
understanding youth disconnection.  
Consolidated inequality theory is an extension of relative deprivation theory 
arguing that the blend of economic inequality and the issue of race give sharp rise to 
feelings of injustice, which requires an aggressive response.65 The central premise of this 
theory is that the focus is on the inequality existing between the races, between the 
“haves” and “have nots,” wherein the proximity of the neighborhoods or communities 
matter. The one concern with this theory is that it contends that the outcome leads to a 
violent response. Not all inequality leads to violent outcomes, but this theory does point 
to the fact that inequality results in outcomes that are unanticipated, such as 
radicalization, because of the inequality—perceived or real. Despite this limitation, this 
theory is helpful in understanding what others perceive as inequality. The alignment of 
this theory to relative deprivation is important because provides a link to inequality as a 
result of a perceived lack of not having that can result in negative consequences such as 
alienation, frustration, crime, and other outcomes. It also ties into the work of James 
Klumpp and Mario Diani because it makes a distinction between “us” and “them,” which 
impacts social identity.  
There is growing evidence to support the assertion that major factors, such as 
youth unemployment, underemployment, unequal access to “education and skills, poor 
governance, weak political participation, gender inequalities and socialization are some 
of the factors that lead to youth disconnection and can serve as motivators for 
radicalization.”66 For Muslim youth in Western Europe, Tunisia, and elsewhere who 
have an education and cannot find employment, experience a sense of relative 
deprivation when they look at their peers, in and outside their immediate communities, 
who have less or equal education and who do not have employment and economic means. 
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These Muslim youth feel relatively deprived, according to Gurr, because there is a 
“perceived discrepancy in their value expectations and value capabilities that lead to 
social discontent.”67 This perceived gap creates frustration that can lead to aggression. 
The issue of frustration, anger, alienation, and other feelings of resentment ties in with 
psychological research in the subsequent section to further explain how disconnection 
leads to radicalization and ultimately violence. Similar parallels can be drawn concerning 
marginalized American youth.  
Relative deprivation serves as a framework to explain individual-to-group 
radicalization. Additionally, relative deprivation holds that groups of people or 
individuals experience deprivation when their present circumstances (economic, political, 
social, education, cultural, etc.) are “negatively compared” to others.68 Groups that are 
socially excluded or feel marginalized tend to have higher rates of radicalized 
individuals.69 When one group of persons (or a community) has less than another group, 
such as money, access to education and other social resources, they may experience 
relative deprivation, which in turn might cause radicalization, especially in Muslim 
communities or groups.70  
When a group is experiencing isolation and relative deprivation, it is easy to unite 
around a singular focus. This way it has better control over its members and can exercise 
greater influence over those radicalized.71 The common enemy is those outside the 
group, and often violence is the only meaningful outcome that will affect the desired 
change. The element of empowerment and significance is important as noted by 
Kruglanski et al. in their research. They explain, “self-identification as a member of a 
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social group larger than oneself can have a buffering effect against life’s failures and 
increase one’s sense of personal power and significance.”72 
Such individual perception of group deprivation can bridge the analytic divide 
between individual and group level radicalization. The radicalizers are promoting a group 
identity that is supposedly deprived or denigrated, and the individual takes up that 
identity. Belonging to the group provides those that are disconnected and who experience 
relative deprivation a collective voice based on a common ideology. Radicalization starts 
with the individual, who may go through some processes as a result of a trigger, an event, 
circumstance that leads some to adopt extreme ideologies and others to engage in 
violence as an outcome. 
b. Social Movement Theory  
Social movement theory grew in part out of relative deprivation theory. Mario 
Diani views a social movement as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality 
of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, 
bound by a shared collective identity.”73 Diani further notes, “This identity creates 
solidarity and makes the network internally homogeneous while functioning as a 
distinctive characteristic towards out-groups.”74 Here the clear goal is to draw a dividing 
line between “us” versus “them,” much as Klumpp defined radicalization in the 1960s.75 
Social movement theory comes together around a three-pronged approach involving 
mobilizing resources, political opportunities, and framing to help explain when and how a 
movement arise.76 From Western European and U.S. perspectives, this theory includes a 
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grievance perspective as it relates to collective action and goes beyond relative 
deprivation.77 Social movements, such as the Civil Rights in the 1960s, Occupy Wall 
Street, and the Arab Spring, include scores of individuals who experience relative 
deprivation or represent groups who are deprived and have taken collective action to 
make their grievances known. Relative deprivation is used in sociology wherein an 
individual or groups experience deprivation over areas such as money, political 
participation, employment, education, social institutions or status, and they create social 
movements to seek change and to engage in social action.78 The idea of collective action 
through mobilization and ideology is central to this theory. Individuals, arguably, 
minority youth—especially African Americans and Muslims—do not just experience 
relative deprivation as an individual, but they experience it as part of a group. As a result 
individuals or groups are taking collective action, sometimes with or without violence. 
Collective action is the means through which anger and frustration are expressed.  
c. Social Distance Theory 
Social distance theory has to do with the social interactions and the “degree to 
which individuals are willing to accept and associate with those having different social 
characteristics.”79 John Hipp notes that the higher the levels of diversity in a population 
from a racial/ethnicity standpoint, the less interaction occurs between individuals.80 In 
addition, he found that the less people interact because of racial or ethnic differences, the 
higher the negative outcomes such as increased crime rates.81 Furthermore, social 
distance is prevalent between “haves” and “have-nots;” economic capability, wealth, 
intellect, social status all add to social distance between groups. Social distance theory is 
helpful in understanding the “intersecting parameters” of inequality and racial 
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heterogeneity and how it increases social distances and leads to disconnection.82 The 
wider the social distance between people, the less interaction, hence, the greater the 
disconnection.83 Bringing this finding together with those of relative deprivation theory 
and social movement theory, those individuals who are socially distant and feel relatively 
deprived and disconnected are more likely to view their social environment in “us versus 
them” terms as well as to be frustrated enough to engage individually and collectively in 
illegal behaviors. By extension, it can be argued that the outcome of social distance 
theory is always negative. As such, the result of disconnection is radicalization that leads 
to frustration with violence and anger as possible outcomes.  
d. Psychological Perspectives  
Psychological studies of terrorism focus on understanding why people become 
radicalized and are recruited to join terrorist groups. According to Adam Moscoe, 
psychological studies are “useful insofar as they allow an interactionist perspective—
integrating both internal and external influences both hereditary and environmental.”84 In 
a study conducted with 60 former terrorists, psychologist John Horgan discovered that 
those more open to terrorist recruitment and radicalization tend to:  
(1) Feel angry, alienated, or disenfranchised. 
(2) Believe that their current political involvement does not give them the 
power to effect real change.  
(3) Identify with perceived victims of the social injustice they are fighting.  
(4) Feel the need to take action rather than just talking about the problem.  
(5) Believe that engaging in violence against the state is not immoral.  
(6) Have friends or family sympathetic to the cause.  
(7) Believe that joining a movement offers social and psychological rewards 
such as adventure, camaraderie, and a heightened sense of identity.85 
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These reasons are personal with deep-seated psychological underpinnings that 
should not be ignored. Horgan’s research focuses on the individual and how he or she 
relates to recruitment and radicalization. Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter outline a 
somewhat similar typology of individual motivations, which are considered not to be 
mutually exclusive; rather, they shed light on why individuals join violent extreme 
terrorist groups:86  
(1) Reasonably circumscribed, concrete and specific political, economic and 
social grievances;  
(2) Much broader ideological (especially religious) objectives;  
(3) The search for economic gain, or the pull exercised by prior involvement 
in illicit economic activities;  
(4) Personal factors (e.g., the desire to avenge a loved one, or to follow a 
friend or relative on the path of jihad).  
(5) Intimidation or coercion by peers or the community.87 
These classifications provide frameworks for understanding why individuals join 
terrorist organizations; however, not all motivations fall into these categories. Some of 
these motivations are very similar to those proposed by Horgan, such as ideology, 
personal factors, and coercion, and these help to explain and put into context the motives 
why individuals become involved in terrorism. Even though the 12 mechanisms of 
radicalization advanced by McCauley and Moskalenko appear to be similar to those 
advanced by Horgan and also by Denoeux and Carter, McCauley and Moskalenko go 
further and identify how the path to radicalization intensifies as it moves from one 
domain to the next.88  
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e. Other Approaches 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Gross empirically examined the “behavioral 
manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 jihadi terrorists.” In their study, they 
focused on and reviewed six areas of the radicalization process: (1) the adoption of a 
legalistic interpretation of Islam, (2) coming to trust only a select and ideologically rigid 
group of religious authorities, (3) viewing the West and Islam as irreconcilably opposed, 
(4) manifesting a low tolerance for perceived religious deviance, (5) attempting to impose 
religious beliefs on others, and (6) the expression of radical political views.89 These form 
a set of behavioral factors they considered indicators of radicalization.  
Marc Sageman states that terrorists from Western countries, who are primarily 
youth seeking fame and thrills, are radicalized in the West, not the Middle East.90 Even 
though there is no terrorist profile, Sageman’s research has found that terrorists appear to 
be second and third generation immigrants, are often from the Muslim diaspora, share a 
common identity, are radicalized in small groups, and are often friends and relatives.91  
Furthermore, Sageman identified a four-stage process of radicalization through 
which a Muslim youth goes.92 The first stage is a sense of “moral outrage,” followed by a 
stage that “interprets the outrage in a specific way,” which in the mind of the individual, 
is an act challenging Islam.93 Stage three has an ideological appeal and “resonates with 
the individual’s personal experience,” and it is regarded as part of a larger war. The 
fourth stage is one in which individuals are essentially “mobilized (recruited) via 
networks” either “online or face-to-face.”94 Even though this framework does not 
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specifically address the issue of violence as an outcome, it lays out the process for 
radicalization.  
Emotions, such as frustration, anger, rage, and alienation, are some of the factors 
that play into any and all of these stages, and they serve as building blocks as the 
individual moves from one stage to the other. Moral outrages of perceived injustices 
against Muslims, such as the Iraq war, the public burning of the Quran, the caricature of 
the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper, the Charlie Hebdo mockery in Paris, 
etc., are powerful igniters of moral outrage, and they conform to the indicators developed 
by Gartenstein-Ross and Gross as well as Sageman.  
In addition, the work of Zachary Shore is very insightful in explaining why 
Europe’s Muslim youth are disconnected and how the continent is serving as the breeding 
ground and the supplier of terrorists with America as the primary target.95 Shore 
highlights the emotional conflicts Muslims in Europe experience in the pursuit integrate 
in mainstream society while abhorring the values the West represents.96 These conflict 
and themes are resonating factors that serve as igniters to radicalization. Furthermore, 
Marc Sageman’s definition is particularly useful because it highlights key indicators 
“along the entire trajectory of radicalization that can lead an individual to violence.”97 
The path to radicalization is not a passive experience because the key indicators of 
transformation in the person’s life are probably evident and visible to others around them, 
such as family, friends, and the community in which they live. Individuals who are 
radicalized to terrorism do so for varying and different reasons. Religion or being a 
devout follower of Islam is not necessarily the only reasons. 
D. THE ARGUMENT: DISCONNECTION AS CAUSE  
Youth are at the critical stage in which they are making the transition to 
adulthood. They are facing choices, including their identity, independence, career 
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opportunities, and they charting the path that will determine their future. Various research 
studies show that youth who views violence on the internet have a greater likelihood of 
similar aggressive and violent behavior.98 Violence is an important outcome of terrorism, 
and youth are particularly susceptible to it. The focus to this age group is also important 
because youth in it will or will not become the future entrepreneurs, lawyers, doctors, 
teachers, engineers, etc., and they will become the economic engine of the next 
generation. During this time, youth are highly susceptible to the media representations of 
violence. It is for these and other reasons the focus is on this age group, and it is 
important to study them, especially since they have the highest rate of disconnection in 
the United States. 
Disconnected youth are considered youth without any hope of getting an 
education or finding a job as a result of the socioeconomic conditions that impede their 
progress or ability to be productive and contribute to society. This study defines youth 
disconnection as youth ages 16 to 24 who are not involved in education or employment 
because of the lack of access and opportunity due to economic, political, social, and 
religious barriers. Youth are disconnected from work, education, employment, and 
economic viability, and they may turn into “frustrated achievers,” which may leave them 
vulnerable and ripe to radicalization to terrorist ideology.99 Therefore, socioeconomic 
conditions, such as poverty, inequality, education, employment, income, and political and 
other factors associated with disconnected youth are therefore hypothesized to be 
important root causes of radicalization.  
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As noted earlier, this study seeks to understand the relationship, if any, between 
disconnection as a result if social, economic, political, and other factors leading to 
radicalization with violence as an outcome. Radicalization concerns disconnected youth 
with no outlet for redress, who feel marginalized with no voice or forum for being heard, 
with little hope of their circumstances changing. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The root causes of radicalization can be divided into two major schools of 
thought, as noted above. One group attributes radicalization to unemployment, lack of 
education, lack of upward mobility, and to social and economic factors, while the other 
attributes it to religion, ideology, and culture.100 However, while both schools of thought 
are valid, they do not bring us any closer to an understanding of how to bridge the gap.101 
It is necessary to understand the interplay between ideology and socioeconomic factors 
and how they influence each other. Ömer Taşpınar posits that the radicalization occurs 
when all multiple factors such as social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological 
factors converge.102 Here the concept of relative deprivation is helpful to explain when 
aspirations, expectations, and hope remain unfulfilled leading to frustration and joining 
an extremist group.103  
The potential for ideological radicalization, humiliation, and frustration, leading 
to ideological radicalization, increases when high hopes and expectations, aspirations, 
and the promise of upward mobility go unfulfilled in people, particularly youth.104 It is 
for these reasons that socioeconomic circumstances and lack of employment and 
education for youth require serious consideration. Education and employment go hand in 
hand, and when one (or both) is missing, it leads to a sense disenfranchisement resulting 
in humiliation, anger, and frustration.  
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Even though studies in the literature point out that lack of education and poverty 
have a marginal effect on radicalization, this chapter suggests that poverty and lack of 
education should not be ignored. Both educated and uneducated youth from wealthy or 
poor families may be equally predisposed to radicalization and violence. Psychological 
factors, such as marginalization, alienation, fear, anger, and frustration, all creates the 
identity of frustrated achievers with little hope of a future.  
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 YOUTH DISCONNECTION IN THE UNITED STATES  III.
A growing number of young people haven’t encountered the American 
Dream. They are the disconnected youth—the more than six million 16-to-
24-year-olds neither participating in the workforce nor enrolled in school. 
Many are high school dropouts, foster youth, and young people involved 
in the justice system—those who have fallen off, who were never put on a 
good path, and too many of whom have been forgotten in the various 
debates around education or employment.  
Chelsea Clinton, August 19, 2013 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To assess whether youth disconnection has an impact on radicalization, the 
concept must be defined and measured. Youth disconnection in the United States is a 
serious problem with generational consequences, as this chapter shows. Youth 
disconnection has significant impacts on social, economic, political, mental health and 
other areas that cost taxpayers billions every year. This chapter provides an overview of 
the definitional differences associated with youth disconnection, followed by a review of 
the various factors associated with this issue. In addition, this chapter includes a national 
U.S. statistical profile followed by deeper exploration into what the youth disconnection 
profile looks like in some metropolitan areas in the United States. This chapter also 
shows the education participation level and dropout rates that serve as important 
indicators of youth participation. Additionally, this chapter examines youth 
unemployment, underemployment, and employment to provide meaning and to help 
frame the issue. Finally, this chapter also sets the foundation for the following chapter on 
radicalization.  
B. MEANING OF YOUTH DISCONNECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Depending on its definition, the estimates of the number of disconnected youth 
vary from one study to the next. The way data are collected, analyzed, and reported are 
all contributing to factors such differences. The number of disconnected youth ranges 
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from 5 million to 6.7 million, depending on the estimates and study being used.105 
Definitional differences explain why the number of impacted youth varies for each study. 
Besides youth not in school and not employed, Youth.gov also includes youth “who are 
homeless, in foster care, and incarcerated in the juvenile justice system.”106 A 2009 Child 
Trends study only includes “youth who are not in school and not employed.”107 A 2012 
Social Science Research Council study estimated that about “5.5 million youth ages 16 to 
24” are not in school and not employed.108 In a study conducted by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), disconnected youth is even more narrowly defined to include 
“youth who are not working and not in school for a longer period of time (versus at a 
point in time, or for instance, over a six-month period).”109 Some studies include youth 
who are in juvenile facilities whereas other do not. As a result, methodological 
differences ultimately impact the number of disconnected youth being reported.110  
The previous discussion points out the challenges of trying to define youth 
disconnection. Youth disconnection evolves over time and impacts social, economic, 
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political, cultural, and environmental dimensions. A similar point has been made in the 
literature review about radicalization as a process that occurs over time and is linked to 
social, political, economic, and cultural environments. In both instances, youth, are 
experiencing perceived political and economic marginalization, which could lead to what 
Klumpp terms a “confrontation” between a perceived “us” and “them” with violence as a 
real outcome.111 Among all these definitions, the two most common threads that are 
repeatedly associated with youth disconnection includes nonparticipation in education 
and unemployment. This thesis seeks to shed light on the factors and characteristics 
associated with youth disconnection and to determine the extent to which these lead to 
radicalization.  
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH DISCONNECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
The narrative of youth disconnection presented above establishes the foundational 
framework, providing an understanding of the impact disconnected youth can have on 
society. If the prospects of educational and employment opportunities are low and 
marginal, it is argued that other, more dangerous opportunities and actors exist and are 
waiting to “take advantage of our disillusioned youth, including ISIL [The Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant].”112 If disconnected youth are not engaged and connected, and 
they are disillusioned and marginalized, they may become easy targets for radicalization.  
Kristen Lewis and Sarah Burd-Sharps identified six characteristics strongly 
associated with disconnected neighborhoods, including “high adult unemployment, low 
adult educational attainment, low human-development levels, high levels of poverty, and 
a high degree of residential segregation by race and ethnicity.”113 These factors are very 
similar to those highlighted in Table 1, which support and strengthen the idea that youth 
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disconnection does not occur in a vacuum. Youth disconnection is a process that does not 
surface overnight; it can be measured over a sustained period.  
Relative deprivation provides an important foundational framework in 
understanding how individuals experience deprivation when their present circumstances 
(economic, political, social, education, cultural, etc.) do not measure up to those of their 
peers.114 The profile offered above is important because it represents the real lives of 
youth, “and the full force of fear, anxiety, prejudice, and even hopelessness.”115 
Disconnected minority youth who are socially excluded or feel marginalized look for 
other ways of self-expression, and violence cannot be discounted as an outcome. The 
Baltimore riots of 2015 serve as a reminder of this phenomenon. During the riots, the 
inner-city youth, who were disconnected and experienced relative deprivation from 
economic, education, political and social participation expressed their frustration through 
rioting and violence. When one group of individuals or community has less of something, 
such as money, access to education and other social resources, than those in another 
group they may experience relative deprivation that may give rise to violence.  
D. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DISCONNECTION  
Family poverty level, family structure, receipt of welfare, parental education, 
parental unemployment, age, race/ethnicity, the existence of older siblings, and gender 
are all factors associated with disconnection.116 Some of these factors, such as family 
poverty, parental education and unemployment, are more prevalent than others in the 
prediction of disconnection.117 In a study by the Pohad Family Foundation, the researcher 
found similar factors, including poverty, racial disparity, structural changes in the job 
market and fragmentation of public support services for youth.118 Using data spanning a 
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period of 21 years, a Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) found that “poverty is an 
important predicator of educational attainment even after controlling for background 
factors.”119 Table 1, from the Pohad study, the lists a range of factors across four 
domains to help explain youth delinquency and to provides a context for understanding 
how they impact disconnection.120  
Table 1.   Risk Factors Associated with Delinquency by Domain121  
Risk Factors Domain 
• Early antisocial behavior and emotional factors such as low behavioral 
inhibitions 
• Poor cognitive development 
• Hyperactivity 
Individual 
• Inadequate or inappropriate child rearing practices, 
• Home discord 
• Maltreatment and abuse 
• Large family size 
• Parental antisocial history 
• Poverty 
• Exposure to repeated family violence 
• Divorce 
• Parental psychopathology 
• Teenage parenthood 
• A high level of parent-child conflict 
• A low level of positive parental involvement 
Family 
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Risk Factors Domain 
• Spending time with peers who engage in delinquent or risky behavior 
• Gang involvement 
• Less exposure to positive social opportunities because of bullying and 
rejection 
Peer 
• Poor academic performance 
• Enrollment in schools that are unsafe and fail to address the academic 
and social and emotional needs of children and youth 
• Low commitment to school 
• Low educational aspirations 
• Poor motivation 
• Living in an impoverished neighborhood 
• Social disorganization in the community in which the youth lives 




Youth disconnection occurs at various levels and can include a number of factors 
associated with the dimensions, listed in Table 1. At-risk factors identified at the 
individual domain can serve as early warning signs, as it relates to cognitive development 
and early anti-social warning signs, to parents and family members. Family domain 
factors also contribute to youth disconnection in similar ways. Poverty, large family size, 
home discord, the low level of parental involvement, and exposure to family violence are 
all factors that play some part in the lack of youth development, which can lead to youth 
disconnection resulting in radicalization. Even though poverty is not the single most 
important driver of disconnection, if and when it is combined with some of the other 
factors included above, its relevance and impact cannot be ignored.  
The at-risk factors related to peers (especially), gang involvement, and bullying 
should be confronted from a community/school/family perspective by teaching youth 
how to reject these drivers of negative social behaviors. Youth seek a common identity 
and the influences of peers are important, especially that of peers that live in the same 
neighborhood. This linkage has been established and discussed in the previous chapter. 
At-risk factors associated with the school and community domain, such as living in high 
crime neighborhoods, low commitment to school, poor academic performance, and youth 
living in underserved neighborhoods, further add to youth marginalization. The higher 
 37 
the likelihood of multiple at-risk factors, the higher the likelihood of negative behavior, 
including delinquency.122 As viewed through the prism of these at-risk factors, 
disconnection impacts youth as individuals and groups, and it has implications for cities, 
counties, metropolitan areas, states, and the federal government. Furthermore, education 
is vital to reducing some of the youth at-risk factors discussed above and is explored in 
the following section.  
E. EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOR YOUTH AGES 16–24 
The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) asserts that “status 
dropout” specifically refers to “16 to 24 year-olds who are not enrolled in school and 
have not earned a high school credential (diploma or equivalency diploma such as 
General Education Development (GED) certificate).”123 Additionally, it refers to the 
number of “individuals who did not complete high school and can serves as an indicator 
of youth disconnection.”124 The status dropout rate dropped to seven percent from  
12 percent for the timeframe 1990 to 2013, and is the lowest it has ever been.125 Despite 
this decline, status dropout continues to impact a large number of U.S. youth who are not 
involved in education; minority youth are disproportionately impacted.  
In a study by Erickson and Phillips, discussed in the Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion, reveals that youth who are religious are “more likely to complete high 
school and enroll in college even when controlling for other individual and interpersonal 
factors that affect educational attainment.”126 The reason for this success has little to do 
with religion and more to do with relationships, mentoring, and social interactions they 
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experience.127 The study by Erickson and Phillips does not offer a breakdown by type of 
religion (Catholic, Protestant, Islam, etc.) to see if there are significant differences.  
F. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT, UNDEREMPLOYMENT, AND 
EMPLOYMENT  
Youth employment among ages 16 to 24 is an important indicator of engagement, 
economic contribution and vitality among this age group. According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistic (BLS), employment is defined as “any paid work by anyone over 16 years 
old.”128 Unemployed youth are defined by the BLS as those who are “jobless, available 
for work, and actively looking for jobs.”129 In the United States, a large proportion of 
youth are either not employed or underemployed, such as those tasked with the 
responsibility to care for elderly or ailing parents, those who are teen parents taking care 
of children alone, or those not actively looking for employment or not enrolled in 
education. This is a positive reason for being counted as unemployed and in many cases 
provides a path to success for this youth demographic.  
Youth employment matters because it brings economic independence and a sense 
of stability and identity into the lives of youth. When employed, they continue to learn 
valuable skills and training that can be carried into adulthood, which is one of the 
important societal anchors that will allow them to provide for themselves and their 
families. Youth who are employed are more engaged in the communities where they 
reside and work, and that engagement provides for opportunities to feel less disconnected 
and more a part of a community. When youth are connected to their communities, there is 
less of an impact on the criminal justice system and potentially reduces future 
dependency on public welfare and assistance. Moreover, youth who are employed are 
better positioned to improve their education, and this reduces youth dropout rates.130 
From an economic standpoint, youth employment opens doors to economic mobility and 
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progress, allowing youth to achieve what is often referred to as the American Dream. It is 
a fact that educational attainment among youth leads to higher income.131  
1. The Youth Unemployment Picture 
Youth unemployment in the United States is a national concern, and it limits 
economic opportunity and social mobility. It is not just a U.S. problem; it is a global 
problem with far reaching consequences. A 2007 United Nations Commission for Social 
Development Report notes long-term effects of unemployment among some youth, such 
as low self-esteem and frustration, make them more vulnerable to increase disease, drug 
and crime use, and, this leads to further marginalization and social exclusion, thus further 
perpetuating poverty cycle.132 The concern and vulnerabilities are real and impacts 
unemployed youth worldwide.  
In a study by the Center for American Progress, a similar sentiment and theme 
were expressed in that today’s “youth ages 16 to 24 face some of the worst employment 
prospects in recent history.”133 The unemployment rate in the United States has 
“increased to a rate of 16.2 percent for all youth ages 16 to 24 in 2013.”134 According to 
the BLS, the “youth unemployment rates for all races remained historically high with 
African-American youth still experiencing the highest rate at 29.7 percent and Asian 
youth, the lowest at 9.9 percent.”135 African American youth, followed by Hispanic 
youth, are disproportionately more impacted or displaced economically than any other 
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groups.136 The high rate of youth unemployment in the U.S requires urgent attention 
given its impact when viewed from social, economic, and political perspectives.  
Youth unemployment brings hidden costs, such as uncollected taxes, and 
increases safety net expenditures, passing the economic burden on to future 
generations.137 It also limits economic mobility, limits potential for future earnings, and 
has been attributed to youth disconnection that in some way influences radicalization.138 
High youth unemployment among minority groups has economic consequences that are 
generational, “and failing to employ young people today will result in lost earnings, 
greater costs, and slower economic growth tomorrow.”139  
Even though it is concerning that disconnection manifests as a societal issue 
among youth, this study does not find that it leads to radicalization. The significant rate 
of youth unemployment remains a global concern, although this research focuses on the 
United States. The impacts on society are significant, requiring new and innovative 
approaches to create lasting changes. The issue of youth unemployment should not be 
viewed in a vacuum; it should be closely tied to education and other youth and social 
development programs.   
2. Youth Underemployment 
Underemployment can be viewed as an individual’s inability to work full-time or 
find regular employment either with respect to their abilities or the fact that the 
employment they are qualified to work does not address with the economic challenges 
they face. In essence, the person is not working within an economic capacity to allow 
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them to improve their situation.140 According to the BLS, no official government 
statistics captures the total number of youth who may be considered as underemployed. 
Even if many or most underemployed youth could be identified, it would still be difficult 
to quantify the loss to the economy of such underemployment.141 Despite this challenge 
and though it is largely ignored, underemployment is as big an issue as 
unemployment.142 In October 2014, the overall underemployment rate in the United 
States was at 11.5 percent, representing 17.7 million individuals.143 Even though the data 
is not broken out by race, age, and gender, doubtlessly, youth are represented in these 
numbers, and it serves as a valuable indicator of disconnection that should be considered. 
The BLS does not track “discouraged workers,” who are defined as those who want to 
work, have looked for work, and are available for work, but have given up on finding 
work.144 Those individuals “who work full-time but live below the poverty level are also 
considered underemployed.”145  
The influences of underemployment and unemployment are the same: they both 
serve as drivers for higher poverty levels. Underemployment reduces the disposable 
income of families and places a drain on national economic and employment growth.146 
Here, relative deprivation is useful in understanding outcomes. When youth expect to 
participate in education and employment yet they are unable to find meaningful work, it 
leads to frustration and anger that could turn into aggression and violence because of an 
unmet expectation. Youth, who are unable to find meaningful employment and are unable 
to develop skills and competencies, have few options for meaningful futures and careers. 
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According to a Gallup Poll survey, “underemployment has a greater effect on the life 
satisfaction for the educated than the less educated.”147 Underemployment can also give 
rise to “frustrated achievers” because it creates a gap between youth’s ability work 
commensurate with their education and the actual condition they find themselves leading 
to relative deprivation. 
3. Youth Employment 
Data from the 2009 Child Trends study cited earlier also indicates “that as of 
October 2014, about 49 percent of all youth between the ages 16 to 24 were employed,” 
regardless of the type of work.148 The study asserts, “Youth enrolled in high school 
experience, an employment rate of 18 percent, while youth in college had a rate of 46 
percent.”149 In contrast, youth not enrolled in high school or college “experienced an 
employment rate of 68 percent,” which means 32 percent were unemployed and not in 
school.150  
In the United States, employment for youth ages 16 to 24 among all racial groups, 
which had been relatively consistent, began to decline in 2007 and in 2008, and it has 
since improved incrementally with the 2014 rate at 49 percent.151 Males are more likely 
to be employed but not attending school when compared to females (72.2 percent and 
63.6 percent, respectively.)152 The labor force participation rate for first-generation 
immigrants is higher than it is for second-generation immigrants.153 Also, the overall 
nonimmigrant youth has a 49 percent labor force participation rate, which, when 
combined the rate for both first- and second-generation immigrant youth, is still 
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higher.154 Immigrant youth are faced with challenges when trying to assimilate into the 
dominant culture, and this could lead to inequalities and disconnection and frustration. 
Youth, especially first generation youth, face barriers such as language, acculturation, 
assimilation, and social norms, as well as a host of economic and political barriers.   
Youth ages 16 to 24 years have lower levels of employment participation as 
compared to those youth who have some college education or have already graduated 
with a degree.155 According to the Urban Institute, in 2014,  
The employment rate for youth with a college degree was 85 percent, 
compared to youth with some college or an associate degree employed at a 
rate of 78 percent, and lastly when compared to a rate of 68 percent for 
youth with no college education at all.156  
These statistics reveal that attaining a college degree, or at least attending some college, 
results in higher employment rates as compared to employment rates of youth with no 
college; whereas, those with less college education has lower employment rates. This 
data also reveals that youth with no college and higher unemployment tend to be non-
white.  
G. YOUTH DISCONNECTION FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
The issue of youth disconnection, is not just a U.S. problem. Europe is also 
grappling with the same challenge and has not fared any better in finding meaningful 
solutions to the problem. The United States, followed by the United Kingdom (U.K.), are 
the two western countries with the highest rates of global disconnection, followed by 
Austria and Canada (as indicated in Table 2). These high rates of disconnected youth 
pose significant challenges because more and more youth are becoming marginalized, 
and they are increasingly finding other ways to express their frustration is not engaged in 
employment or education.  
                                                 




Table 2.   Youth Disconnection in the United States, Canada, and Select 
European Countries157  
Country Disconnection Rate % 
Unites States 13.8 
United Kingdom  13.4 
Austria  11.4 
Canada  10.5 
Germany  9.5 
Norway  9.2 
Finland  8.6 
Switzerland 6.8 
Denmark  5.7 
Netherlands 4.1 
 
A study by Hans Dietrich reveals youth unemployment for those individuals 
younger than 25 years of age was increased after 2012, due in part to the European 
economic crisis, while the adult employment rate increased during the same 
timeframe.158 A study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) found that for youth ages 15–24 years old, unemployment for the period ending 
in 2009 was about 19 percent, impacting nearly 15 million youth.159 In addition, the 
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OECD study found that in Italy and France, the youth unemployment rate was about 25 
percent, while more than 40 percent of youth is without jobs.160 
Youth who are engaged and connected have higher self-esteem, feel less anxious, 
have a positive outlook, and are involved in a meaningful activity.161 They are also less 
apathetic, more optimistic, and learn and develop healthy practices and habits that they 
can carry into adulthood.162 The identities of youth who are engaged in employment and 
education are formed out of a healthy self-respect and an innate sense of 
responsibility.163  
Disconnected youth remain at increased odds with themselves and their reason for 
being. As a result, they often start searching for meaning and relevance in other areas not 
conducive to norms and expectations of society. Does the fact that these youth feel 
disconnected and marginalized result in an increased risk of becoming radicalized to 
terrorism? Raul Caruso and Evelina Gavrilova provided expert testimony to the 2012 
Global Terrorism Index.164 Based on their research looking at the nexus between youth 
unemployment and terrorism, they argue that 
The relationship between youth unemployment and political violence 
contributes to solve the dilemma on the relationship between education 
and terrorism. In fact, the level of education influences the sense of 
frustration and grievances perceived by younger individuals. Put 
differently, educated individuals in the presence of unfavorable economic 
landscape perceive that their expectations on employment outcomes are 
not likely to take shape. In other words, a superior education magnifies the 
grievance mechanism. The Arab Spring seems to be a fundamental 
example in this respect.165 
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Educated youth who do not have employment prospects and who constantly face 
economic barriers will eventually become dissatisfied and make their frustration known 
in a tangible way. Youth who are poor, unemployed, uneducated, and disconnected may 
be radicalized for different reasons than youth who are educated. In the end, the same 
conclusion can be assumed: youth who are educated or uneducated, and regardless of 
their employment status, if they feel disconnected for personal, political, religious, social 
and to a lesser extent economic reasons, may can become radicalized, leading to them to 
commit acts of terrorism. This notion ties in closely to Gurr’s definition of relative 
deprivation because the gap between “ought” and “is” appears to be so wide it may 
ultimately lead to violence.166 The work of Horgan is also relevant to relative deprivation 
especially regarding youth who are without education, unemployed or underemployed, or 
alternatively, youth with education but no employment prospects. It can all lead to anger, 
frustration and marginalization, especially when they perceive that the current economic 
and political environments have left them behind.167 When there is no outlet for a 
grievance, violence may not just a threat but reality.  
H. MUSLIM YOUTH AND DISCONNECTION 
The key challenges related to youth disconnection as outlined in Table 2 is very 
similar to that of youth in Europe and in the United States. The residual effects of lack of 
youth employment, such as concern for drug use, violence, and extremism, are some of 
the social impacts. As previously discussed, the lack of economic and political 
participation are other concerns, and they increase feelings of deprivation in many forms, 
such as economic inequality, political participation, which leads to further 
marginalization.  
The reasons why youth become disconnected, reasons such as poverty, conflicts 
and wars, and gender, are real concerns that should be addressed as it relates to 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. A 2015 report by the OIC lists 
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some of the key challenges facing Muslim youth in specific countries as it relates to 
youth disconnection (see Figure 1).168 
Figure 1.  Challenges of Youth from OIC Perspective169   
Challenges of Youth from OIC Perspective 
First Islamic Conference of Youth Ministers, held in Jeddah during 1–2 May 2007, 
identifies the following challenges faced by the youth in the OIC countries: 
A. In the social field: Shrinkage in the family role, the disconnection of some Muslim 
youth from the Islamic values, the spread of the evils of violence, extremism, drug-
addiction, along with the rise in the rate of unemployment and the spread of serious 
diseases among youth.  
B. In the cultural field: a deficit in religious education, lack of awareness-raising, 
cultural and psychological alienation among the youth, along with a shortage in 
trainings for those active in the field of youth and the aggravated crisis in terms of a 
mature dialogue between religious institutions and youth, all of these have led to 
conversions to other faiths or disregard for Islamic values.  
C. In the political and economic fields: The lack of youth participation in decision-
making and in politics has resulted in the absence of youth in the evolvement of 
economic and poverty alleviation policies. The gap between the social strata grew wider 
economically and socially with a rising cost of living, declining wages, and 
disproportions between the outputs of education and the needs of the labor market along 
with an insufficiency in program funding.  
D. In the Area of Education: There is a general weakness in terms of the quality of 
youth and general education programs and a failure to keep abreast with modern 
technologies on the part of the centers of learning.  
E. In the field of environment: The youth’s disconnection from activities in 
environmental programs and failure to tap on environmental resources as investment 
and job-opportunities for youth, along with a disinterest in the youth’s environmental 
awareness.  
 
Youth everywhere in the world are faced with similar disconnection challenges, 
and the youth in Muslim countries are no exception. The impact of religious structures 
and imposed structural and cultural values does not always guarantee that youth will not 
                                                 
168 Organization for Islamic Cooperation, Key Challenges of Youth in OIC Countries (Ankara, 
Turkey: Organization for Islamic Cooperation, Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training 
Centre for Islamic Countries, 2015), http://www.sesrtcic.org/files/article/525.pdf.  
169 Source: Organization for Islamic Cooperation, Key Challenges of Youth in OIC Countries.  
 48 
be impacted. Disconnection in the OIC framework occurs across all facets of social, 
cultural, political, economic, education and environment youth life. These challenges 
require thoughtful responses to reduce the negative outcomes of which radicalization is 
one.   
At a rate of over 15 percent youth unemployment remains a challenge for OIC 
countries.170 This high youth unemployment rate contributes to the fact that youth are  
Experiencing tremendous levels of stress due to limited opportunities for 
social mobility and due to restrictions on fully participating in social, 
cultural, economic and political life. This state of affairs leads in many 
cases to social turmoil and political unrest.171  
The reasons above are the same risk factors cited in Figure 1 and underscore the 
importance of these variables in reducing youth disconnection. Fundamental and real 
change at every level is required, especially in Muslim countries as well as in developed 
countries with significant Muslim populations. These countries need to build a more 
inclusive and tolerant society and aim at reducing poverty and increasing participation in 
education, politics, civil society and organs of government. Youth employment rates 
decreased marginally in OIC countries from 45.4 percent in 2000 to 44.4 percent in 
2012.172 Religious beliefs in these countries influence the likelihood of female 
employment. Females are less likely to enter the labor force given the high rate of youth 
unemployment.  
Given the rapid and evolving nature of change in OIC countries due to population 
shifts, there are also many other issues are now impacting youth disconnection. Those 
challenges include broader social health and welfare issues affecting social mobility as 
well as other relevant issues, such as the use of tobacco, drug and alcohol use, mental 
health issues, and technology. Youth now face more health related issues without the 
ability to pay for healthcare, which increases public health expenditures and costs. Any 
changes to policy in an attempt to address these issues should be viewed from a position 
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of understanding and compassion. Global research on youth employment is equally 
disappointing. According to a 2015 International Labor Organization (ILO) report, “the 
worldwide unemployment rate among 15- to 24-year-olds is 13 percent, or 74 million 
youth, and is set to rise.”173 The likelihood is this number reported here may be six to 
seven times higher because youth who are underemployed or underpaid are not 
included.174 This leads to a greater disparity of income and wealth; young women are 
disproportionately impacted. The ILO report citing the work of Dr. Marjorie Woods 
notes,  
In unequal societies, democracies are more likely to be corrupted, workers 
are more likely to be exploited and abused, and the safety net for the poor 
or vulnerable is weakened. The ILO report states social unrest and 
possible violence is linked to rising inequality and youth unemployment. 
Social unrest is said to have ‘shot up’ during the financial crisis, and 
worldwide, currently sits at 10 percent higher than before the crisis.175  
The minimizing and removal of barriers to youth unemployment and 
underemployment, as well as lack of access to education, can be considered vital factors 
affecting the social, economic, political, and mental health of a society. If not addressed, 
youth unemployment and underemployment may continue to create wealth and income 
inequality, engender poverty, and lead to racial and social problems, such as drug and 
alcohol abuse, mental problems, and a host of other issues with lasting and generational 
effects. Furthermore, it possibly can lead to youth disconnection and can serve as drivers 
for youth searching for relevance. Also, it may result in this disenfranchised population 
seeking that relevance through the radicalization process and potentially ending with 
terrorist extremism.  
I. CONCLUSION 
The expectation of education and employment in the United States is not a 
guarantee but the right of access is. Youth who are disconnected and not part of the 
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process of education and employment may turn inward and express their anger in the 
same way youth who are educated do, but for different reasons. Youth who are educated 
often become frustrated because they are not able to receive an income commensurate 
with their education, and they may feel deprived because they are not realizing the full 
promise of their education. When faced with high levels of unemployment, educated 
youth can become further marginalized, which may leads to even greater frustration with 
violence as an outcome. Youth who are disconnected more than likely are also frustrated 
because the ability to participate in education and employment is beyond their reach, and 
they become frustrated because they do have an education or the skills required to find 
employment.  
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 RADICALIZATION IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES, EUROPE AND IV.
THE UNITED STATES 
The radicalizing factors of young people in Europe and beyond, however 
varied, are nonetheless rooted in socio-economic stimuli or the lack 
thereof: a lack of social and cultural integration, a lack of economic 
opportunity, a lack of employment. When hope and opportunity are 
eclipsed, Mr. Neumann suggested, extremism will often feed off of the 
resulting despair.  
Peter Neumann, Director, 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, London 
 
A. FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THEIR ORIGINS 
The number of radicalized foreign fighters to ISIS and other terrorist groups 
increased over the past few years and Western countries have continued to provide a 
supply line. As of September 2015, the estimated number of foreign fighters in Syria was 
about 28,000, according to the Justice Department.176 However, in 2011, estimates 
placed that number at less than 1,100; it increased to 8,500 in 2012, and more than tripled 
in 2015 to 25,000 and is currently, estimated to be close to 30,000.177 Both the United 
Nations (UN) and the United States agree on these estimates.178 In a July 2015 UN 
special meeting of “member states on stemming the flow of foreign fighters, it was 
reported that there are more than 25,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria representing more than 
100 countries.”179 Contrary to some views, the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS 
continues to increase.180  
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe the makeup of foreign fighters who 
joined terrorist groups over the past six years. This chapter also provides a context and 
framework for the previous chapters to tie the theoretical framework of relative 
deprivation, psychological motivations, social movement theory, and other theories as a 
way to understand the increase in the number of Muslim youth radicalized to terrorism. 
This chapter is divided into three sections outlining the various regions and countries 
foreign from which the fighters come. The first section focuses on foreign fighters who 
come from Muslim countries, and this emphasizes that the problem of radicalization is 
not just a Western one. The next section focuses on foreign fighters whose origin is from 
Western Europe, which indicates how radicalization to terrorist organizations has spread 
among Muslim youth in this region. The following section highlights the nature and 
scope of the issue in the United States and seeks to understand the scope of the issue, 
especially among Muslim youth who are disconnected and marginalized. The remainder 
of this introduction describes some methodological issues concerning the data. 
The estimates above indicate that the issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is 
a global problem (more than 100 countries). Furthermore, as shown above, there has been 
a significant increase in foreign fighters in a five- to six-year time span. This poses 
serious threats to homeland security for Western countries in particular, especially since 
about 20 percent of the foreign fighters are Westerners.181 The numbers reported in this 
thesis are merely estimates that should be greeted with caution because of methodological 
problems. Not only are they sourced and reported differently. It is also impossible to 
verify and confirm, they are often represent different periods of time. Additionally, they 
comprise of different reporting mechanisms and include duplicate counting; overall, they 
are problematic. However, despite all these shortcomings, these figures are still a useful 
gauge of the extent and scope of the issue and can largely be defended by those reporting 
it.  
All the estimates from various sources provide corroboration that the number of 
foreign fighters have grown significantly in a relative short time. This is cause for 
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concern for governments of the home countries where these fighters come from. At some 
point, they have to return to their home country. The question is: What then?  
To complicate things further, there is very little consensus on the definition of a 
foreign fighter among scholars or institutions. Navigating the definitional complexities 
and nuances of what constitutes a “foreign fighter” is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, from a contextual perspective, it is important to identify the meaning of a 
“foreign fighter” because it impacts the overall statistics reported throughout this thesis. 
The work of Alex Schmid is especially helpful concerning this. He notes that a foreign 
fighter is one who “voluntarily leaves his home country to engage in armed conflict in an 
area with no apparent link bound by a sense of Muslim religious duty.”182 Religion is 
certainly an important factor in the decision to become a foreign fighter, but is it not the 
only one. Other factors, such as economic and political deprivation, the West as the 
common enemy, joining the caliphate, etc., are equally strong motivators. These factors 
confirm some of the underlying psychological reasons of radicalization identified through 
the terrorism research of Horgan, McCauley and Moskalenko, and others discussed in the 
Chapter II.183 
Schmid cautions that not all who go to Syria go there to fight. Included in these 
estimates are women, who join their husbands, and children, which may explain in part 
why some of the estimates are high.184 Therefore, foreign fighters can be thought of 
broadly as a term describing those fighters who are not citizens of the country they are 
fighting in or fighting for but do so out of religious duty. The phenomenon of fighting in 
a foreign country is not new, but the context and dynamics in which these fighters fight is 
different, layered, and complex. 
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The profile presented here provides a framework for the next sections in this 
chapter by offering a breakdown by region from where foreign fighters come. This sets 
the stage for an in-depth look at foreign fighters from Muslim countries, Western Europe, 
and the United States. The overarching purpose is to understand why so many foreign 
fighters are joining terrorist organizations and to inspect it through the lenses of 
theoretical frames such as relative deprivation, social inequality, and some of the 
psychological perspectives discussed in Chapter II. The regional data of foreign fighters 
provided by Alex Schmid and Judith Tinnes and others is especially helpful because it 
offers a glimpse from where fighters originate (see Table 3). 
Table 3.   Regional Background of Foreign Fighters185 
Regional Origin Number of Foreign Fighters 
 
Fall 2014186 Fall 2015187 % Change 
Middle East 6,141 8,240 34.2% 
North Africa (Maghreb) 5,660 8,000 41.3% 
Western Europe 2,770 5,000 80.5% 




(Western) Balkans 442 875 98.0% 
South Asia 385 - N/A 
South East Asia - 900 N/A 
Sub-Saharan Africa 170 - N/A 
North America 42 280 566.7% 
 
As depicted in Table 3, foreign fighters come from numerous regions and are 
diverse in terms of ethnic, cultural, language, and racial backgrounds. This data also 
                                                 
185 Adapted from Schmid, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates, 23.  
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supports the claim that the trend of foreign fighters are increasing and not decreasing.188 
The role of the internet that serves as a recruiting vehicle of Western Muslims and others. 
What is most concerning is the significant upward tick in foreign fighters from the United 
States and Russia from a percentage change standpoint, followed by Western Europe. 
The reasons for the high number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are varied, and the 
assumptions are these reasons probably differ from one region to the other. One of the 
reasons already identified has been the common draw of religious duty. Other factors, 
such as economic, political, social, thrill seeking, relative deprivation, also come into 
play. The economic, political, and social displacement of refugees who have lost 
everything are all factors that fuel this flow to ISIS and other terrorist groups.189  
Radicalization to terrorist groups, such as ISIS and others, are not just a Western 
problem as is discussed later; it is also a Muslim problem. Being a Muslim, living in the 
Middle East or in a Muslim country does exempt one from being radicalized to terrorism. 
The following section explores the scope of the issue of radicalization to terrorism by 
analyzing the number of fighters from Muslim countries, their reasons and motivations. 
In addition, it connects it to relative deprivation theory, social movement theory, social 
inequality theory and some of the other theoretical underpinnings. Dissatisfaction, 
alienation, being denied the right to live in a country of which one is a citizen, injustice 
(especially the large, displaced Syrian populations), perceived inequality, and relative 
deprivation are strong motivators for Muslim youth to become radicalized and join 
terrorist groups.  
B. FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM MUSLIM COUNTRIES  
The word foreign fighter is somewhat of a misnomer as previously discussed. 
Given the absence of a global database to report the names of foreign fighters, countries 
rely on systems of self-reporting and best guesses, lacking accuracy and uniform data 
reporting standards let alone systems integration. Regionally, Muslim countries are 
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responsible for the majority of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq with six out of ten 
coming from these countries. Europe is a close second as a region. See Table 4. 
Table 4.   Number of Foreign Fighters from Top Ten Countries190 




Committee Estimate191  
National Government Estimate192 
Tunisia  5,000 ca. 3,000 (official figure, April 2014) 
Saudi Arabia 2,275 ca. 2,500 (official estimate, May 2014) 
Jordan 2,000 no data 
Russia 1,700 (FSB, April 2014) 
France 1,550 over 700 (official figure, April 2014) 
Turkey 1,400 about 400 (official estimate, April 2014 
Morocco 1,200 about 1,500 (official figure, April 2014) 
Lebanon 900 no data 
Germany 700 about 300 (BfV, March 2014) 
United Kingdom 700 about 400 (official est., March 2014) 
   = Muslim Countries 
  
ISIS has enjoyed success in recruiting fighters from local territories under its 
control.193 The data reveals foreign fighters are more diverse and younger than ever. 
Another troubling aspect is the fact that a significant number of young women, in some 
                                                 
190 Adapted from Schmid, Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates.   
191 Adapted from U.S. Congress Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on 
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Committee, 2011), 11.  
192 Adapted from U.S. Congress Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force and 
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countries up to 20 percent, are recruited and joining ISIS.194 Young women typically do 
not engage in fighting but serve as brides and provide companionship.195  
In close proximity to the Syrian border, Tunisia has a significant number of 
disconnected youth, both educated and uneducated, as well as a fractured religious 
identity with a renewed focus of Salafi jihadist, a high unemployment rate, poor 
socioeconomic conditions, and it is in political transition. All of these factors fuel 
radicalization.196 Tunisia has experienced the largest number of youth who are 
disconnected and joined ISIS, chiefly due to government instability and lack of economic 
opportunity.197 For Tunisia to experience such as the high rate of disconnected youth 
who are radicalized and turning to terrorism is an alarming trend. More and more youth 
are disconnected from economic and political participation.  
Repressive and autocratic governments, unstable economic growth, poor labor 
and employment policies are all factors that lead youth to disconnection and frustration. 
The Arab Spring of 2011 serves as a powerful symbol and reminder of how the 
frustration and anger of youth can spur a national movement and ignite violence. Anger 
and frustration are strong factors may have everything to do with relative deprivation. 
The work of Gurr is relevant in the Tunisian context because he helps explains how mass 
discontent that stems from a gap between “expected” and “achieved” wellbeing, which 
results in political violence.198 According to Gurr, collective violence results directly 
from relative deprivation. Specific to this point, Gurr contends that “the greater the 
intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective 
violence.”199  
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Financial compensation is a powerful motivator and provides a vehicle for these 
young radicalized terrorist to support their families, especially for those youth who comes 
from less affluent family backgrounds.200 If underprivileged Muslim youth have very 
little prospects for the future, live in relative poverty, or are “frustrated achievers” 
terrorism seems like an attractive and economically viable option. There are also other 
reasons such as an attraction to an ideology, religion, and seeking identity and relevance. 
Horgan cites one motivating reason to be the “belief that joining a movement offers 
social and psychological rewards such as adventure, camaraderie and a heightened sense 
of identity.”201 The psychological factors and reasons can often outweigh the financial or 
economic reasons, even in the midst of dire economic need.  
The war fought by ISIS is as much a war of ideas and ideology as it is one of 
territory and region. The aspirational aspects and appeal of the war in Syria and Iraq, 
where youth are recruited regionally from other Muslim countries to escape poverty, 
marginalization, economic, and social deprivation are considered key drivers to 
radicalization. Terrorist groups provide relevance and meaning, and to some extent, they 
provide a sense of hope to the lives of impacted youth.  
The literature reveals no direct relationship between terrorism, education and 
poverty, and if one there is one, it is probably negligible.202 In her research, Carolyn 
Ziemke echoes a similar theme.203 However, in a study conducted by Clarke Richardson, 
he found that there is a positive relationship between education, unemployment, and the 
number of terrorist related attacks in 56 countries.204 What would cause such a large 
number of educated youth in Tunisia and other parts of the world to engage in terrorism?  
It is the contention of this thesis that when youth experience high levels of relative 
deprivation, the perception or feeling that they have less then what they should have, they 
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become dissatisfied. This leads to frustration and anger, which in turn are expressed in 
terrorism.205 Derek Birrell, who studied relative deprivation within northern Ireland, 
reminds us “that tensions in groups originate when there is gap between “what should be 
versus what is” within the context of collective value satisfaction.”206 The psychology of 
“frustrated achievers” as it relates to relative deprivation has been explored in Chapter II 
and forms an integral part of why individuals engage in terrorism. Relative deprivation 
among those that have a formal education and experience economic, social, and political 
marginalization is not just a phenomenon experienced in Muslim countries, it is also a 
phenomenon that is prevalent in Western countries, especially in Western Europe. This 
requires closer examination.    
C. FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM EUROPE AND WESTERN COUNTRIES  
As previously indicated, the estimate of foreign fighters from Western Europe in 
Syria and Iraq ranges from between 5,000 and 7,000, and these fighter are primarily 
identified as either second generation Muslims or those that recently converted to 
Islam.207 The literature shows that Western European foreign fighters who go to Syria 
and Iraq do so for “different reasons, however, the role of religion in the decision to 
become radicalized is an important one.”208  
The centrality of a group identity has been a key factor in the radicalization 
process. Most of these foreign fighters know one another, come from the same 
neighborhood, or belong to the same sports of social clubs.209 A good example of these 
radicalized community members is the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris in which 
many of the attackers knew one another and came from the same Molenbeek 
neighborhood in Brussels.210 Western Europe continues to serve as a conduit and a 
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supply line of radicalized individuals seeking to join foreign fighting efforts, including to 
ISIS and other extremist organizations. Furthermore, joining a terrorist group reinforces 
social relationships, a common-shared set of values around an ideology, recognition, self-
worth, and even compensation.211 Terrorist groups to some extent provide a sense of 
cultural relevance that seems to strengthen the identity and self-worth of the recruited 
fighters.  
A review of the literature reveals that the there is no single profile of foreign 
fighters coming from Western Europe. According to Alex Schmid, some terrorists are 
from low income families while other are middle class. The education background of 
foreign fighters vary across Western European countries; however, they are 
predominantly male, immigrant, and between the ages 16 to 29.212 In Krueger and 
Malečková’s study of the relationship between education, poverty, and terrorism, they 
found that terrorists are better educated and come from affluent family backgrounds.213 
Caroline Ziemke states that an individual who functions in a robust democratic society is 
less likely to be involved in terrorism; in contrast, persons who live in authoritarian and 
dictatorial societies accompanied by poverty, violence, and political marginalization have 
a greater likelihood to turn to terrorism.214  
Western Europe clearly falls within the first part of this description of Ziemke, yet 
it is falling prey to the same level of discontent and frustration as individuals who live in 
authoritarian societies. It is evident that something else is going in Western Europe and 
other Western countries that is contributing to so many youth joining ISIS and other 
terrorist groups. These youth are making rational and deliberate choices to engage in 
terrorism.215 In his research, James Piazza found “minority economic discrimination to 
be a strong predictor of domestic terrorism regarding the level of general economic 
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development.”216 Economic minority discrimination from a social standpoint is often 
overlooked, but serves as an igniter of terrorism.217  
It is important to understand the social context of youth who converge to 
terrorism. When youth, especially Muslim youth, are disconnected from being active 
participants in educational and employment processes, or when educated youth cannot 
find meaningful employment, it leads to disillusionment, frustration, and anger that 
manifest itself in many forms. Structural poverty and inequality within countries 
according to Gurr serves as “breeding grounds for violent political movements in general 
and terrorism specifically.”218 Understanding the factors that give rise to inequality and 
prevention of individuals becoming full participants in terrorism is key to understanding 
relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is borne out of inequality stemming from a 
void, which is between what people want and what they actually get. If this void or gap, 
whether perceived or real, between expectation and gratification left unfulfilled is 
expected to lead to frustration and ultimately violence.219 Violence as it relates to 
terrorism and as contended in this thesis is the result of frustration and anger that has built 
up over time as a result of such unmet needs. There are similar patterns of disconnection 
among Muslim youth in Western Europe as a result of relative deprivation. This is also 
evident in the United States.  
D. MUSLIM-AMERRICAN YOUTH AND RADICALIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES  
The primary purpose of this section is to focus on Muslim youth in the United 
States by offering a demographic profile, followed by an analysis of the scope of 
radicalization as a precursor to Chapter V. The Pew Research Center, reported that 
Muslims “are the fastest growing religion in the world and estimated to be about 1.6 
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billion,” which is roughly about 23 percent of the world population as of 2010.220 
Muslims in the United States are “estimated at about 2.75 million of which about 1.8 
million are adults, and 63 percent first generation Americans.”221 Approximately, 21 
percent of the U.S. Muslim population did not graduate from high school, and about 24 
percent possess either a college or graduate degree.222 Muslim Americans are fairly 
young with about one third falling into the age group 18 to 29.223 Even though Muslims 
share Islam as a common religion, their ethnic, racial, social, cultural, and political 
differences are many, providing a context for exploring youth disconnection and the 
relative deprivation factors that lead to anger and frustration.  
Muslim Americans are racially and ethnically very diverse with “approximately 
38 percent of Muslim Americans describing themselves as white, 26 percent black, 20 
percent Asian, and 16 percent other or mixed race.”224 Racially and ethnically, there is no 
single group who constitutes and represents Muslims. Religious affiliation is closely 
linked to the country of origin. For example, among first and second generation 
immigrants from Arab countries, 56 percent are Sunni, 19 percent are Shia, and 23 
percent only state they are Muslim.225 Pakistanis and south Asians are overwhelmingly 
Sunni (72 and 82 percent, respectively), while most Iranians are overwhelmingly Shia (91 
percent).226 
America as a melting pot of different immigrant ethnicities, cultures, races, 
religions, nationalities, and people is based on an assumption that everybody will fit in 
and assimilate once they arrive; this may be a fallacy. Second generation Muslim 
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immigrants have often been targets of radicalization because of the disconnection they 
experience in their new Western cultures. As outlined in an article by Sarah Lyons-
Padilla et al., “more attention should be directed to immigrants’ identity processes, or, 
how people manage their identities with their culture of origin (for example, home 
country or religion) and their identities with their new home country’s culture.”227 It is 
important to understand how the lack of cultural and religious integration into the 
dominant culture can also lead to disconnection from a psychological standpoint.  
Compared to Muslims in other Western European countries, Muslim Americans 
are more integrated in American life. However, despite this picture presented above, 
underemployment among young Muslim Americans is prevalent, with 18 percent 
working part-time, and 29 percent unemployed.228 This high level of youth disconnection 
among Muslim American can lead to exclusion and marginalization. This is coupled with 
the fact that first generation immigrants are still dealing with two cultures that they have 
to reconcile from a psychological standpoint. Second-generation Muslim youth have to 
find their own identity navigating between the duality of being both Muslim and 
American, while also dealing with disconnection and other marginalization factors that 
challenges those identities and values.  
The Syrian refugee problem holds various implications and security concerns for 
the United States especially the plan to increase the number of women and children 
admitted to 10,000.229 The state of Michigan is the top destination, especially the Detroit 
areas, given it large Arab immigrant population.230 One in 10 refugees or roughly 1,036 
of the 10,000 have settled in the Detroit area, which is an important point, especially 
given the higher number of disconnected youth for Michigan.  
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Given the diverse religious and other practices outlined above, it is hard to make 
generalizations about Muslims in the United States as it relates to sympathy with terrorist 
or other groups.231 Muslims in the United States generally live in urban or metropolitan 
areas with large populations and ease of access to cultural and religious institutions and 
services. Group identity and community forms an important aspect of Muslim culture and 
is evident by where they live as outlined above. There are also a number of imprisoned 
African Americans (estimated to be around 30 percent) who have converted to Islam 
while in prison.232  
In a 2015 survey was administered to “198 first and second-generation Muslim 
immigrant adult youth” in the United States.233 The purpose of the survey was to 
understand the contributing factors to radicalization among immigrants, who are 
considered to be a demographic with potential vulnerability.234 The researchers found 
that those Muslim American youth “who identify with neither their heritage culture nor 
the culture they are living in feel marginalized and insignificant,” are significantly more 
likely to be radicalized than those who feel more integrated with either culture.235 This 
likelihood was much more significant when paired with “a perception of discrimination 
against Muslims in the U.S.”236 This research is consistent with other studies and 
confirms religion is not the primary motivator for becoming radicalized.237 Their study 
found that  
Marginalized immigrants in the United States may be at much greater risk 
for feeling a loss of significance, which, in turn, may be related to 
increased support for fundamentalist groups and ideologies. A loss of 
significance stemming from personal trauma, shame, humiliation, and 
perceived maltreatment is associated with increased support for 
radicalism. Experiences of discrimination exacerbate this process. 
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Discrimination by others in the larger society was associated with 
amplified feelings of a loss of significance, which, in turn, predicted 
support for fundamentalist groups and causes. Marginalization and 
discrimination are particularly potent when experienced in tandem.238 
Discrimination as a form of oppression can lead to alienation and marginalization, 
and this can result in questions of self-worth and value judgment from an identity 
standpoint. Regardless of form (economic, social, racial, political, education or 
employment), discrimination often serves as a stimulus for the development of minority 
grievances and reinforces social exclusion on some level.239 Additionally, discrimination 
can often lead to distrust, fear, frustration, and anger, which can make individuals more 
susceptible to radicalization and for Muslim youth to join terrorist groups. Discrimination 
of Muslims, in general, and Muslim youth, in particular, can also be viewed through the 
prisms of relative deprivation and consolidated inequality theories. The consolidated 
inequality theory is closely aligned to the relative deprivation theory as it relates to the 
issue of race give sharp rise feelings of injustice that requires a response.  
E. CONCLUSION  
Factors contributing to the radicalization of Muslim youth should be understood 
within the context in which these youth live. Societal and public policy factors contribute 
to a negative sense of self-worth among Muslim-American youth. If ignored, this will 
likely lead to increases in radicalization in these communities. The connection between 
disconnection and radicalization is one that should be taken seriously. This chapter and 
the preceding ones show that there is a causal relationship between disconnection and 
radicalization. Chapter V demonstrates from a data analysis standpoint the nature and 
scope of such a relationship and looks at key variables.  
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 RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS V.
The more important reason is that the research itself provides an important 




The purpose of this chapter is to answer the primary research question: Does 
disconnection among youth in the United States cause radicalization to terrorism? Based 
on the literature review, it is clear that radicalization as a concept is highly subjected and 
hard to measure from a quantitative standpoint. There is very little empirical research to 
measure radicalization. By considering the wide definitional variations of radicalization 
found in the literature, this research seeks to determine if disconnections leads to 
radicalization among youth. However, the data and prior research demonstrates that 
disconnection and poverty does not lead to radicalization. Individuals from all walks of 
life (poor, middle-class, educated, non-educated, young, adult, etc.) are radicalized for 
various reasons, including political, environmental, religious ideology, social, and 
economic ones. As noted, not everyone who is radicalized commits violence to achieve 
their goals such as political or economic participation, end of oppression or conflict, etc.  
However, some individuals who are radicalized and proclaim a jihadist ideology 
may also express their views by tangible demonstration of violence. Terrorism-related 
arrests and plots in the United States have been on the increase since 9/11 as this chapter 
shows. Some of these plots have been prevented and some were not. In those instances 
that terrorist related plots were not prevented, many innocent victims were killed or 
wounded. It is such acts of violent outcomes that this thesis uses to quantitatively 
measure radicalization and to analyze and understand its impact.  
B. DATA 
Much of the data in this chapter comes from two datasets on terrorism in the U.S. 
post-September 11, 2001, obtained from New America Foundation, “a think tank and 
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civic enterprise committed to renewing American politics, prosperity, and purpose in the 
Digital Age.”240 The terrorism data from New America consists of two data sets. The 
first data set is labeled People Protected and consists of 30 variables or data points for 
386 terrorists who have been either killed or arrested in the United States. This provides 
important background information relevant to this study. This data, analyzed in the third 
section of this chapter, provides a framework and context for the second data set as well 
as the section on the qualitative data analysis. The variables include name, age, gender, 
type of attack, marital status, name of terror plot, and citizenship status. It does not, 
however, include religious affiliation. Appendix A provides a complete listing of 30 
variables associated with 386 cases. It is important to note that this data set seeks to 
identify the terrorist associated with a particular planned terrorist attack. For example, the 
2002 Buffalo Six individuals involved in this terrorist plot, includes data such as the 
names, age, gender, marital status, whether the individuals were charged or are deceased, 
their citizenship status, etc. This data set focuses on the number of people involved in a 
particular plot. As a result, this data set lists all the individuals involved or associated 
with a particular plot, indicating the overall number of plots and the number of people 
involved since September 11, 2001. In some instances, the data for some of the variables 
was either missing or not provided. Supplemental data from scholarly sources is used to 
fill in gaps, particularly regarding religious affiliation of perpetrators. 
Many of the terrorist plots and attacks are included in the first data set, but the 
second data set goes further and is used to quantify radicalization as defined in this study. 
For purposes of this thesis, radicalization is defined as a process wherein an individual or 
a group chooses to adopt, internalize, and act on a new ideology or set of beliefs aimed 
at challenging the prevailing social, economic, political status quo with or without 
violent outcomes. Radicalization in this study is measured using the START variables, 
such as the “number of people who died, number of people injured, the number of 
attempted terrorist attacks, and, the number of ideologically motivated severe crimes 
(violent or non-violent), as they may serve as a gateway to other ideologically motivated 
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violence.”241 These variables are listed in the data set from New America, labeled Terror 
Attacks, and consist of 27 variables for 200 cases. It is analyzed in the fourth section of 
this chapter. Many of the terrorist plots and attacks are included in the first data set, but 
this data set goes further and is used to quantify radicalization as defined in this study. It 
includes all of the terror plots used for the People Protected data, but the focus of this 
data set is on the terror attacks, not the number of people arrested or associated with a 
particular plot. Some of the variables included in this data set are name of terror 
plot/attack, victims wounded, victims killed, plot status (if it was prevented or not), the 
method of prevention, etc. Appendix B provides a complete listing of 27 variables 
associated with 200 cases.  
Taken together, these two data sets provide a detail picture of the number of 
successful terrorist attacks, the number of attacks not prevented, and number of victims 
wounded and killed. Appendix C provides a breakdown of the profile data previously 
discussed. The dataset is limited in its utility to address whether Muslim youth in 
metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection areas are at a greater risk of 
radicalization as compared to Muslim youth in metropolitan areas with lower rates of 
disconnection because it does not contain a variable for religion. Despite this limitation, 
the data is still useful in providing trend analysis and an overall picture of terrorist 
attacks.  
These data does not provide the religious affiliation of attackers or an estimate of 
the total dollar value of damages associated with terrorist attacks. Additionally, it falls 
short measuring radicalization in its entirety. This research does not explore the 
relationship between and among the characteristics related to ideology and religious 
beliefs of terrorist, between holding a particular jihadist ideology and achieving the aims 
of such an ideology. These limitations have been explored in some ways by researchers 
in this area.242 Other characteristics, such as success of certain terrorist groups to recruit 
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from certain economic and demographic profiles (high unemployment, lower income 
levels, large number of family members, etc.), were not explored in this research. Despite 
these limitations, the data is extremely helpful in in answering the research question of 
this study.   
C. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ON TERRORISTS ARRESTED OR KILLED  
According to the People Protected data, a total of 386 individuals were arrested 
and charged with terrorism in the United States from September 11, 2001, up to 
September 30, 2016 (as listed in Figure 2). The number of terrorism-related arrests and 
charges remained relative stable from 2002 to 2007 (as shown in Figure 2). In 2008, only 
five cases of terrorism-related arrests and charges were reported. In 2009, however, there 
was a large increase in the number of terrorist related arrests followed by a decline from 
2010 to 2014. In 2015, there was a record high 77 terrorism-related arrests and charges; 
the largest and significant increase ever.243 (Blank in Figure 1 refers to those individuals 
arrested during this timeframe but where no year of the arrest was indicated in the data.)  
Other data helps refine our understanding of how many plots were perpetrated by 
Muslims. A 2012 study by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) determined that 
“there were 135 total plots by U.S.-originated non-Muslim perpetrators against the 
United States since 9/11. In comparison, there have been 60 total plots by U.S. and 
foreign-originated Muslim perpetrators since 9/11.”244 The research undertaken by John 
Mueller and published in a collection of case studies of almost every Islamic extremism 
case in the United States that provides an objective and detailed analysis of 98 cases of 
individuals radicalized to terrorism that was prevented.245 The case studies only include 
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2016. http://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/part-i-overview-terrorism-cases-2001-
today/  
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those where the plots included violence and “came to light” before they occurred.246 
What is especially helpful in Meuller’s work, and missing from the New America data, 
set is an attempt to provide an estimate of the policing cost involved in preventing 
terrorism is. For example, the “Lackawanna case concerns a group of twenty-something 
Muslim boys from Lackawanna, New York” was estimated to cost about $3 million in 
policing and man-hour related costs only.247 Charles Kurzman, a sociologist at 
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, has investigated terrorist plots by Muslim-
Americans.248249His data provides information missing in the New America data. 
Kurzman’s data include 81 Muslim-Americans associated with violent extremist plots in 
2015, the highest annual total since 9/11 of which the majority involved travel (22 
individuals) or attempted travel (23 individuals) to join terrorist groups.250 According to 
a George Washington University (GWU) Program on Extremism study, about 
approximately “40% of those arrested are converts to Islam. Approximately, a quarter of 
American Muslims are converts, they appear to be overrepresented among American ISIS 
supporters.”251 All these various data sets indicates the relatively low number of terrorists 
attacks in the United States overall and the increase success of law enforcement in 
thwarting such attacks. The number of terrorist attacks in the United States that law 
enforcement are not able to prevent are becoming less predictable, more frequent, public, 
and violent. Also, the datasets all confirm that 2015 has been a particularly busy year for 
terrorist related arrests and activity in the United States. The data from New America 
provides a picture of the number of terrorism-related arrests in the United States after 
9/11. Even though 2015 and 2016 have experienced a spike in terrorist related attacks in 
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the United States, the hope is that this trend is anomalous; only time will tell. These are 
listed as “(blank)” in Figure 2.252 
 
Figure 2.  The Number of Terrorism-Related Arrests and Charges in the United 
States after September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2016253  
(1) Age, Gender, and Marital Status 
From September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2016, the average age of those 
arrested and charged with terrorism was 29 years, and the median age 26, and the 
majority of those arrested were male. For the same period, the average age of females 
arrested for terrorism was 33 years. The age of the youngest individual arrested was a 15-
year-old male, and the oldest was 76 years old. The youngest female arrested was a 19-
year-old, and the oldest was 63 years old. Ninety-three percent were male, and seven 
percent female.254 The GWU study mentioned above reported very similar age and 
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253 Source: New America, “In Depth.”    
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gender data.255 Forty three percent of those arrested and charged with terrorism in the 
United States after September 11, 2001, were unmarried, 37 percent were married, 14 had 
an unknown married status, five percent were divorced, and 1 percent was separated from 
their spouse.256 
(2) Citizenship Status 
For the period of the data, 53 percent of those arrested and charged with 
terrorism-related incidents were U.S.-born citizens, 23 percent were naturalized citizens, 
10 percent were illegal immigrants, 4 percent were refugees, and only 3 percent held 
nonimmigrant visas, and 3 percent were permanent residents. Citizenship status was not 
listed for 49 individuals arrested and charged with terrorism-related incidents.257 
(3) State of Residence for Those Charged with Terrorism  
In the period studied, 15 percent of terrorists arrested and charged with terrorism 
indicated New York as their state of residence, which represents 16.3 percent of the total 
arrests. In addition, 10.7 percent lived in Minnesota, 10.7 percent in Virginia 8.7 percent 
in California, 7.9 percent in Florida, and 5.1 percent in Illinois.258 The data shows that 
terrorism-related arrests and charges are widespread in the United States with East Coast 
states (including New York, New Jersey, Georgia, Virginia, Florida, Massachusetts, 
Maine), accounting for 47 percent of all terrorism-related arrests and charges.  
(4) Terrorists Who Had Contact with Foreign Militant Groups and Received 
Overseas Military Training  
An analysis of the data indicates that, from after September 11, 2001, to 
September 30, 2016, of those terrorists arrested, one third (125 of 384) had contact with 
foreign militant groups prior to their arrests. Of those who indicated they had contact 
with foreign militants, about one third (or 42 of 125) said they received overseas military 
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training. Seven percent of those arrested had prior U.S. military training and 
experience.259 The data also shows that 43 percent of those who were arrested were 
radicalized online. The average age of those who were radicalized online is 32 years old, 
and the majority were male.260  
(5) Terrorists Who Are Muslim-American 
The data depicted in the Figure 3 for the number of Muslim-American terrorism 
suspects since 9/11 shows a very similar trend as Figure 2. However, this data goes 
further, highlighting whether the target was in the United States or abroad, and if the 
travel plans of the terrorists were disrupted or not. In 2015, the terrorist-related attacks 
were especially violent, with 19 victims killed.261 Despite this high number of victims 
killed in 2015, it is still less than 1 percent of the number of Americans murdered in 
2015, and only 14 percent of the 134 individuals killed in mass shootings.262 Despite 
these comparisons, terrorism-related incidents and deaths are highly sensitive subjects in 
the United States after 9/11.  
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Figure 3.  Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators since 9/11263 
D. NATURE AND SCOPE OF TERRORIST PLOTS/INCIDENTS—
MEASURING THE DEFINITION OF RADICALIZATION 
The purpose of this section of the analysis is to quantify and measure 
radicalization in the United States from after 9/11 until September 30, 2016. The data for 
this analysis comes from New America. It is based on 200 terrorist plots/attacks in the 
United States and abroad that were either prevented or not prevented for the period 
immediately following September 11, 2001, to September 30, 2016. This data used in this 
analysis is a subset of the data used in the previous section but focuses solely on terrorist 
attacks and plots in the United States.  
1. The Number of Terrorist Plots/Incidents in the United States and Its 
Status  
Of the total number of terrorist incidents that has been tracked by New America 
from 2001, there has been a total of 200 terrorist attacks/incidents, of which only four 
occurred in a foreign country (see Figure 4). The data shows 195 (98 percent) of the 
terror plots that occurred or were planned were in the United States of which 150 (84 
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percent) were prevented. Moreover, 25 of the plots or attacks (14 percent) occurred in the 
United States and could not be prevented. Another 20 percent of the overall plots had no 
status—therefore, they cannot be labeled as prevented or not in the United States.264  
 
Figure 4.  Attacks in the United States after 9/11265 
2. Number of Terrorist Plots/Incidents Prevented in the U.S. by Status  
Of the 150 attacks that were prevented in the United States from 2001 to date, 31 
were based on tips from informants, 16 were militant self-disclosed, 15 were based on 
community/family tips, 10 were based on routine law enforcement, and 11 by suspected 
activity reports (see Table 5).266 The majority (42 percent) of the terrorist plots prevented 
a result of vigilant efforts by community and family, informants, and self-disclosure by 
militants. Combined, these prevention methods appear to be successful and useful. Blank 
refers to those individuals arrested during this timeframe but the year of the arrest was 
indicated in the data.  
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Attack in the U.S. Foreign
Attacks in the U.S,  Prevented or Not Prevented, 
Post-9/11 to September 2016  
Prevented Not prevented prior to incident (blank)
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Table 5.   Plot Type (U.S. or Foreign) and whether Prevented or Not 
Prevented267  





Plot not prevented prior to the incident 25 4 29 
Community/family tip  1 1 
Not prevented prior to the incident 23 3 26 
(blank) 2  2 
Plot prevented  150  150 
Community/family tip 15  15 
Informant 31  31 
Militant self-disclosed 16  16 
National Security Agency (NSA) bulk collection 
under § 215 1  1 
NSA surveillance targeting non-U.S. persons 
under § 702 5  5 
NSA surveillance under an unknown authority 3  3 
Other non-NSA intelligence provided by CIA, 
FBI, etc. 11  11 
Routine law enforcement 10  10 
Suspicious activity report 11  11 
Unclear 46  46 
(blank) 1  1 
(Blank) 20  20 
Grand Total 195 4 199 
 
New America and other sources note that Muslim-American informants played an 
important role in working with the FBI and local law enforcement to foil these plots.268 
According to New America, over a quarter of plots planned by Muslim-Americans are 
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foiled by a tip-off from a family member, member of the community, or another eight 
percent by the general public. In addition, almost half are foiled through the work of 
informants.269 
3. Ideology—Based on Plot or Attack in the United States  
Regardless if they were prevented or not, 90 percent of the plots in the United 
States are associated with jihadist ideologies, 9 percent right-wing ideologies, and one 
plot with a left-wing ideology. Of the 25 plots and attacks that occurred in the United 
States for the period of the data set dates, 87 percent of them are jihadist ideology based, 
and 13 percent on right-wing ideologies. Figure 5, from New America, shows 
chronologically the terrorist incidents in the United States, the number of victims, and the 
ideological motivation of the perpetrators. Jihadist attacks ratchet upwards in 2010 with 
the Fort Hood killings, again in 2013 with the Boston Marathon bombing, and most 
fatally in 2015, with the Orlando nightclub shooting. 
 
Figure 5.  Ideological Motivations of Terrorist in the United States270  
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Even though the majority of the attacks are associated with jihadist ideologies, the 
data does not point to an association with Muslims or Muslim youth. The research by 
Kurzman is very helpful in remedying this gap and identifies that in 2015 about  
66 percent of Muslim-American terrorism suspects were ages 15–24.271 Also, a 
significant number of those arrested are from working-class families, one-third were 
students, and about 66 percent (two-thirds) were U.S.-born.272  
4. Number of Victims Wounded/Killed in Terrorist Attacks in the 
United States 
Between 2001 and September of 2016, there were 25 attacks in the United States, 
resulting in 351 victims wounded and 109 victims killed (see Table 6).  
Table 6.   Plots and Attacks in the U.S. Not Prevented and Victims Wounded 
and Killed273 
Year and Description of Plot/Attack # of Victims Wounded 
# of Victims 
Killed 
2001 Shoe Bomber Plot 0 0 
2002 Los Angeles Airport Shooting 4 2 
2006 Seattle Jewish Federation Shooting 5 1 
2006 SUV Attack 6 0 
2009 Christmas Day Bomb Plot 0 0 
2009 Fort Hood Shooting 32 13 
2009 Little Rock Shooting 1 1 
2010 Northern Virginia Military Shootings 0 0 
2010 Times Square Bomb Plot 0 0 
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing 170 4 
2014 Las Vegas Police Ambush 
 
3 
2014 New York Hatchet Attack 2 0 
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273 Source: New America, “In Depth.”  
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Year and Description of Plot/Attack # of Victims Wounded 
# of Victims 
Killed 
2014 Oklahoma Beheading 1 1 
2014 Washington and New Jersey Killing Spree 
 
4 
2015 Boston Beheading Plot 0 0 
2015 Charleston Church Shooting 
 
9 
2015 Chattanooga, Tennessee Military Shooting 2 5 
2015 Colorado Planned Parenthood Shooting 9 3 
2015 Garland, Texas Shooting 1 0 
2015 San Bernardino Shooting 21 14 
2016 New York City-New Jersey Bombings 31 0 
2016 Orlando Night Club Shooting 53 49 
2016 Philadelphia Police Shooting 1 0 
2016 St. Cloud Mall Stabbing 10 0 
2016 Wasil Farooqui 2 0 
Grand Total 351 109 
 
The data in Table 6 indicates that the number of terrorist attacks in the United 
States is becoming more frequent and more violent, based on the number of victims 
wounded and killed, and more public. Since 9/11, there have been five terrorist attacks in 
the United States and a total number of 97 victims wounded and 49 killed. The surprise 
nature of these attacks is concerning, and the majority of the attacks were committed by 
terrorist who had a jihadist ideology.  
E. IS THERE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCONNECTION 
AND RADICALIZATION? 
The places that had the highest number of victims killed and wounded (see  
Table 6) include Boston, Massachusetts; Fort Hood, Texas; New York City/New Jersey; 
and Orlando, Florida. New York was ranked number 29 out of 51 states for disconnection 
rates, New Jersey was ranked at number 18, and Florida was ranked the highest at 
number 38 (Appendix D). However, by comparing the statistics in Table 5 to Appendix 
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E, we find that at the metropolitan area level, the area of Boston-Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) and Newton (New Hampshire) was listed third lowest out of 98 areas in 
terms of disconnection rates; the metropolitan area of Fort Hood-Killeen in Texas is not 
listed in the data; the New York, Newark (New Jersey), and Jersey City (Pennsylvania) 
area was listed as 48th; and the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford area in Florida (FL) was 
listed as 50th.  
The data from the START dealing with county-level correlates of terrorism is 
helpful in refining our understanding. The study by LaFree and Bersani found evidence 
of terrorism at the county level that terrorist attacks cluster in specific geographic 
areas.274 Specifically, their findings show that 25 percent of “all attacks occurred in just 
10 counties. Manhattan, NY experienced the highest number of attacks during this time 
(n = 30), followed by Los Angeles County, CA (n = 19), San Diego County, CA (n = 16), 
Washington, DC (n = 15), and Miami Dade County, FL (n = 14).”275 However, smaller 
counties such as Bernalillo County, New Mexico, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and Lane 
County, Oregon have also been targets of terrorism attacks.276 The START study by 
LaFree and Bersani offers the following geographic profile of what a “typical” U.S. 
county looks like that has experienced a terrorist attack for the period 1990–2010:277 
• a larger population  
• more young men aged 15 to 24 years  
• a greater proportion of Asian, Hispanic, and foreign-born residents,  
• higher rates of language diversity278 
This profile offered by START is extremely helpful in trying to understand all the 
characteristics that lead to terrorism. However, the study observed a shift in the profile 
from attacks in the 1990s as compared to those counties that experienced an attack from 
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2001–2010. The researchers explained, “2001 to 2010 had smaller proportions of males 
aged 15 to 24 years, higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, greater proportions of 
foreign-born citizens, and higher rates of language diversity.”279 The study is careful not 
to suggest that terrorist attacks are more likely undertaken by youth who are poor, speak a 
foreign language, and are foreign-born.280  
The data offered by START is important and helpful to understanding the 
characteristics of demographic mixes at the county and metropolitan levels. Since 
counties exercise greater control over budgets, programs, and social and health services 
as compared to metropolitan areas, the data is extremely helpful to develop and create 
effective programs related to the development of language programs, population mixes 
within the county, and youth development programs. However, we need to also 
understand the factors that cause disconnection. What are the motivations that led to their 
radicalization? It is something more than merely being disconnected from education and 
employment? The following section tries to answer this question, part of the primary 
research question.  
F. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF WHY TERRORISTS RADICALIZE 
This qualitative analysis is based on secondary data that serves to supplement the 
quantitative analysis performed in the previous section to answer the primary question: 
Are youth in major U.S. metropolitan areas/cities with high rates of disconnection easier 
targets for ideological radicalization than youth in metropolitan areas with lower 
disconnection rates? 
The secondary qualitative data for this section comes from a variety of data 
sources, including the GWU Program on Extremism, the Terrorism and Extremist 
Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database from START at the University of 
Maryland, and the work of John Mueller at the Ohio State University. This research and 
data is most relevant to this study because it focuses on terrorism in the United States, 
and it has context and content applicability, and suitability that is relevant to this study. 
                                                 
279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid.  
 83 
Some of the data is still in development, such as the TEVUS database, and is constantly 
being updated. This qualitative analysis serves to supplement the quantitative analysis 
performed in the previous section to answer the primary question: Although other 
qualitative studies and data exist, such as the work of Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and 
Laurita Denny, who conducted field work and interviews with 35 imprisoned terrorists in 
2002.281 The information from the Post interviews though very relevant and useful, may 
have limited contextual relevance and applicability because the subjects were Middle 
Eastern terrorists whose experiences are very different from youth in a suburb in New 
Jersey or a town in Virginia radicalized to terrorism.  
The following themes are explored through further analysis: risk factors, self-
policing, motivations, peer groups and group dynamics, and the role of the internet and 
social media. The question of whether individuals who live in larger cities or 
metropolitan areas are more susceptible to radicalization versus less populated areas is 
one that is inconclusive and requires further examination. This section seeks to do so by 
providing a context by looking at the reasons why individuals become radicalized. In a 
July 2015 conference by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), under the auspice of the 
Department of Justice, researchers identified the following facilitators of radicalization:  
Connections with violent extremists in an individual’s social network, 
identity processes, violent extremist belief systems and narratives, group 
dynamics, connections with violent extremists and violent extremist 
material via the internet and social media, grievances, search for meaning, 
threats or perceived threats, triggering events, and activities to 
demonstrate commitment.282 
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Researchers at the conferences also noted that one of the most common 
facilitators of radicalization is having “family members, friends or associates involved in 
violent extremism.”283 Another facilitator, especially in the area of youth radicalization, 
is identity process, particularly among second and third generation youth who struggle 
with being both a Muslim and an American. According to Kurzman, the issue of 
“Muslim-American identity” is an important facilitator of radicalization that will be 
discussed further.284 These facilitators of violent extremism are extremely important in 
informing our understanding of why individuals radicalize to violent extremism. 
Moreover, they may vary from individual to individual terrorist but are the most common 
facilitators of radicalization. The next section highlights some of the potential risk factors 
why individuals in the U.K., Canada and the United States radicalize to violent 
extremism.  
1. Potential Risk Factors Associated with Radicalization 
Preliminary findings from START’s Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the 
United States (PIRUS) Project highlights several risk factors of radicalization note 
“group dynamics, ideological factors, relationships with other extremists, and platonic or 
romantic relationship troubles were common among all extremists groups” including far 
right, far left, and Islamist extremist.285 However, among Islamist extremists, START 
identified “demographic factors—such as being between 18 and 28 years of age, not 
married, and/or not closely integrated into U.S. society—were related to the use of 
violence as well as having been abused and having a criminal history.”286 These finding 
are consistent with the demographic profile data related to those arrested for terrorism-
related charges outlined in Section C of this chapter.  
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Other risk factors associated with violent extremist that came out of the NIJ 
conference is listed in Table 8. A risk factor is defined by Department of Justice 2015 
report as the “something that increases the likelihood that someone will radicalize to 
violent extremism” whereas a protective factor is something that reduces that 
likelihood.287 It was noted by the researchers of the report that the absence of protective 
factors increases the likelihood of violent outcomes, whereas the presence of protective 
factors reduces the likelihood of violence.288 Since these factors were not scientifically 
tested, its validity remains unclear. Despite this shortcoming, Tables 7 and 8 provide a 
useful listing of both the risk-inducing and risk-reducing factors that should be identified 
and understood to develop meaningful counter strategies. These risk and protective 
factors are not meant to be a laundry list of items or a checklist to show cause and effect; 
however, they can serve as actionable items to develop a framework to develop effective 
counter strategies aimed at reducing the likelihood of risk while understanding their 
context and limitations. Protective factors as outlined in Table 8 should be encouraged 
and strengthen while also seeking and identifying new ones to expand and to grow to 
counter the risk factors in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Potential Risk Factors for Individuals Radicalizing to Violent 
Extremism289 
 RISK FACTOR MAY RESULT IN A PERSON 
Individual Factors 
 
Experiencing identity conflict Being attracted to a belief system that purports to have all of the answers. 
Feeling there is a lack of meaning 
in life 
Being attracted to a belief system that 
purports to have all of the answers. 
Wanting status Being drawn to opportunities to prove one-self to be heroic, brave and strong. 
Wanting to belong Being drawn to joining a tight-knit group. 
Desiring action or adventure Being drawn to participating in dangerous, illegal and/or violent activity. 
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 RISK FACTOR MAY RESULT IN A PERSON 
Having experienced trauma* Being vulnerable to those who promise recompense or revenge. 
Having mental health issues or 
being emotionally 
unstable/troubled 
Being vulnerable to others’ influence. 
Being naïve or having little 
knowledge of religion and 
ideology 
Being open to fringe religious and 
ideological interpretations. 
Having strong religious beliefs Being drawn to those who claim to be guided by religion. 
Having grievances Being drawn to those who promise to address these grievances. 
Feeling under threat Being open to engaging in activities that purport to remove this threat. 
Having an “us versus them” world 
view 
Being ready to view those outside one’s 
group as enemies. 
Justifying violence or illegal 
activity as a solution to problems* 
Being open to joining with those who 
engage in violence and illegal activity. 
Having engaged in previous 
criminal activity* 
Being open to joining with those who 
engage in illegal activity and justify it as 
part of a greater mission. 
Contextual Factors 
Stressors (e.g., a family crisis, 
being fired from a job) 
Being drawn to explanations that blame 
others for one’s situation. 
Societal discrimination or 
injustice 
Being drawn to those who promise 
recompense or revenge against those who 
discriminate or oppress. 
Exposure to violent extremist 
groups or individuals Viewing violent extremists as less extreme. 
Exposure to violent extremist 
belief systems or narratives 
Viewing violent extremist belief systems 
and narratives as less extreme. 
Family members or others in 
violent extremist network* 
Identifying with violent extremists and 
viewing them as less extreme. 




Table 8.   Potential Protective Factors against Individuals Radicalizing to  
Violent Extremism290 




Being confident in one’s own views and 
less likely to be easily influenced by 
others. 
Having strong ties in the 
community* 
Feeling one is a member of a community 
and has someplace to turn when facing 
difficulties. 
Having a nuanced understanding 
of religion and ideology 
Being less accepting of religious or 
ideological interpretations that are 
simplistic or dogmatic. 
Contextual Factors 
Parental involvement in an 
individual’s life 
Feeling one’s family is present, cares and 
is ready to help in times of difficulty. 
Exposure to nonviolent belief 
systems and narratives 
Being able to identify a range of 
alternatives to violent belief systems and 
narratives. 
A diversity of nonviolent outlets 
for addressing grievances 
Feeling one’s grievances are 
acknowledged and respected as well as 
believing in the possibility of their being 
resolved in a lawful manner. 
Societal inclusion and integration Feeling one’s group is a valued member of society and is treated fairly. 
Resources to address trauma and 
mental health issues 
Feeling that help is available when facing 
cognitive and emotional difficulties. 
*Protective factor was identified by comparing individuals who did and did not endorse extremist 
violence. 
 
2. Self-Policing and Community Safeguarding 
The number of arrests that lead to the prevention of terrorism in the United States 
does not happen in a vacuum, as has been shown in Section C. Muslim Americans are 
playing an important role in policing their communities and reporting terrorism-related 
activities to law enforcement. In his research Kurzman found that “Muslim-Americans 
are engaged in a heightened level of self-policing against radicalization that may help to 
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account for the infrequency of terrorist activities by Muslim-Americans.”291 Below are 
some narratives of community involvement when it comes to radicalization.  
In Houston, for example, a Muslim religious leader harshly scolded a man 
who “told me that he would’ve been proud if it was his sons [who were 
responsible for 9/11].”292  
In North Carolina, another religious leader said he called the FBI when a 
young man in the community appeared to be on the verge of violence: “I 
reached the point where I felt, I have to report this to the authorities, 
because if, Allah forbid, if he left and did something, even just harming 
himself, I would be liable before Allah, why didn’t I tell the authorities so 
that they could stop him.”293 
Another man said he called the authorities when a friend of his started 
talking angrily about possibly avenging civilian casualties in Iraq: “He 
was talking about how bridges are going to be blown up into the sky, and 
stuff, and I was really thinking, somebody is going to do something like 
this, the way this friend of mine was talking. I was suspicious of the way 
he was talking with me. I called the FBI myself, and I told them this 
person, this name, this telephone number. . . . The way he talked, it wasn’t 
comfortable for me.”294 
Also, family members have played an important role in reporting other families suspected 
of involvement in terrorism-related activities especially, when they were missing 
overseas, for example,  
Omar Hammami, who traveled to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab in 2006; 
the Somali-Americans in Minnesota who left for Somalia in 2007 and 
2008; and five young men from Northern Virginia who traveled to 
Pakistan in 2009.295  
These narrative are in total contrast to the Post interviews in which families encouraged 
and played a pivotal role in the radicalization process while in other instances they were 
at least supportive.296  
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3. Motivation for Radicalization to Violent Extremism  
In the case studies collected by John Mueller, motivations for why individuals are 
radicalized to violent extremism are described. The overwhelming driving force as to 
why individuals radicalized, and were involved in terrorism was a sense anger at U.S. 
foreign policy.297 This includes America’s role in Afghanistan and Iraq, its support for 
Israel, and the overall lingering Palestinian conflict.298 This motivation highlighted by 
Mueller is consistent with some of the themes this thesis explored in Chapter II and is 
consistent with the work of Martha Crenshaw.  
4. Peer Groups and Group Dynamics 
Researcher at the NIJ conference noted, 
Belonging to a tight-knit group was linked to individuals being more 
likely to accept their fellow group members’ views, more likely to 
consider those inside their group more positively (in-group favoritism), 
and more likely to consider those outside their group more negatively 
(outgroup derogation).299 
Those who are being radicalized detach them from their previous lives to attach and align 
their identity to the new group. Western youth being radicalized are more accepting of 
differences of group members and seemed to coalesce around a common ideology where 
it is “us” versus “them.”300 The common enemy is the United States and other Western 
governments; they serve as a unifier strengthening the bond among and between those 
being radicalized. 
5. The Role of the Internet and Social Media  
From a Western standpoint, the role of the internet and social media cannot be 
overemphasized as it relates to facilitating the radicalization process. The internet 
provides a forum in which individuals can view, read, and be exposure to radical ideas, 
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see terrorism violence, and have contact with extremists by the click of a button or with a 
tweet. More than 50 percent of the NIJ conference researchers that participated noted,  
In addition to potentially leading individuals to become more accepting of 
violence and fostering feelings of closeness with those who perpetrate it, 
virtual connections can provide individuals with practical guidance that 
may facilitate extremist violence.301 
…connections via social media may also lead individuals to see 
similarities between themselves and those currently engaged in violence, 
and some may experience this as empowering.302 
Even though social media is used as propaganda tool, it remains an effective 
medium of communication with low risk to those doing the recruiting and its power and 
potency cannot be denied or ignored. Researchers at the GWU Program on Extremism in 
their study explain,  
Social media plays a crucial role in the radicalization and, at times, 
mobilization of U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers. The Program on Extremism 
has identified some 300 American and/or U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers 
active on social media, spreading propaganda, and interacting with like-
minded individuals. Some members of this online echo chamber 
eventually make the leap from keyboard warriors to actual militancy.303 
American ISIS sympathizers are particularly active on Twitter, where they 
spasmodically create accounts that often get suspended in a never-ending 
cat-and-mouse game. Some accounts (the “nodes”) are the generators of 
primary content, some (the “amplifiers”) just retweet material, others (the 
“shout-outs”) promote newly created accounts of suspended users.304 
G. A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE 
UNTIED STATES 
For this section of the analysis, the thesis has reviewed the extensive work of John 
Mueller on all the cases that have come to light of Islamist extremist terrorism since 9/11, 
whether based in the United States or abroad, in which the United States itself has been 
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or apparently has been targeted. Table 9 lists the individual attributes associated with the 
risk factors to radicalization.305 
Table 9.   List of Relevant Individual Attributes Associated with Terrorists in the 
U.S. Tally of Cases/Individuals Based on a Review of the Mueller 
Research306 
Money and Greed 
Money (12) 
Mental Health/Psychological Issues 
Anger (20) 
Aggression (6) 
Mental health (5) 
Depression and schizophrenia (5) 
Drug and alcohol use (6) 
Hatred Towards Israel and the U.S. 
Hatred (13) 
Martyrdom and personal sacrifice (19)  
Commit violence (9) 
Identity Conflict/Crisis (10) 
Socially marginalized (10) 
Gullible or suggestible (4) 
Malleable (3) 
Emotionally immature (4) 
Confused identity (8) 
Isolation (18) 
Personal Grievances (17) 
Assignment of blame (others, U.S. Government, Israel, military) (11) 




Previous criminal record (3) 
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Violent Extremist Ideology 
Jihadist ideology (43) 
Family members or others in violent extremist network 
Family influence on terrorism (3) 
Stressors 







Religion surfaces in these cases prominently as playing a significant role in the 
radicalized process. They were devoted to their religion, were at the mosque regularly, 
and recruited or attempted to recruit others. In the cases reviewed by Mueller, many of 
the individuals who had criminal records and were in prison but converted to Islam found 
a sense of discipline and stability in their lives that facilitated in the radicalize process. 
This is the case with Richard Reid (2001 Shoe Bomber), Jose Padilla (2002 Padilla Plot), 
Kevin James, and Levar Washington (2005 Folsom Prison Plot).307 Many of those 
converted to Islam had a poor understanding of the religion, and as a result, they were 
easily influenced and malleable. This is the case with Shahawar Matin Siraj and James 
Elshafa, 22- and 19-year-olds, respectively (involved in the 2004 Herald Square Bomb 
Plot), who both had mental issues, were extremely malleable, and easily influenced.   
Some of the attributes revolved around the theme of soldiers and war. The four 
terrorist involved in the Jama’at Ul-Islami As Sahih (JIS) plot regarded themselves as 
warriors who were fighting a global war, and they believed they were involved with a 
massive clash of civilization. Another theme that surfaced around the issue of social 
alienation and loneliness. Attributes around this theme includes feeling like a social 
outcast and looking for social solidarity. Hamid Hayat, the 19-year-old who was arrested 
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in Lodi, California, and Taheri-Azar, the 22-year-old University of North Carolina 
student, were both introverts who lacked strong social skills. It was also the case with the 
six Lackawana boys; they lacked social skills, experienced identity conflict by being both 
Muslims and Americans. Additionally, they were searching for guidance and meaning. 
Similarly, 22-year-old Ahmed Omar Abu Ali experienced alienation. Shahawar Matin 
Siraj and James Elshafa, 22- and 19-year-olds, respectively, also experienced alienation 
and felt socially marginalized.308 A theme that seems to emerge from the data is that that 
younger terrorists experienced social marginalization and alienation more than older 
terrorists; however, further research is required to explore this. The data shows that lack 
of educational attainment is not a key factor in why individuals are radicalized. Fifty-five 
percent of the cases researched by Mueller indicate the terrorist had a college education 
(completed or attended), or had completed high school. Also, 17 percent were college 
dropouts. In almost all of the cases, money was one of the least motivating factors. As 
has been hypothesized in this thesis, educational attainment and youth has no connection 
to why individuals become radicalized.  
Some of the other themes that emerged as a result of the attributes in Table 9 
include U.S. foreign policy, hatred towards Israel, the discrimination and general 
perceived oppression that Muslims suffer, mental and emotional problems, alienation and 
social marginalization.309 
1. A Representative Sampling of Terrorist Cases in the United States 
The following section provides a representative sample of various terrorist related 
cases in the United States to reinforce some of the individual attributes outlined in  
Table 9.  
a. 2001 Shoe Bomber Plot 
Richard Reid, a 22-year old British citizen, attempted to blow up an American 
Airlines flight from Paris bound for Miami; however, he was subdued by passengers and 




flight attendants before he could detonate the bomb.310 Reid’s parents divorced when he 
was 11 years old, and he was a high school dropout. In addition, he had a criminal 
background and had converted to Islam while in prison.311 Reid was constantly searching 
for identity and gravitated toward a life of crime312 Mueller notes, “converting to Islam 
helped Reid identify a sense of identity and community that he was lacking.”313 The 
reasons for Reid’s radicalization was justice and the U.S. involvement in the Middle East.  
b. 2006 SUV Attack 
Mohammed Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old immigrant from Tehran, Iran, was an 
introvert with poor social skills.314 He was intensely religious and had read the Koran 20 
times. In addition, he believed and practiced a version of Islam adapted to his own 
ideology and set of beliefs.315 Below is an excerpt from John’s Mueller’s book to 
underscore the lack of remorse portrayed by Taheri-Azar.  
On March 3, 2006, a young Iranian-American man, a recent graduate of 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, returned to his alma mater 
in a rented Jeep Grand Cherokee equipped with four-wheel drive, drove to 
a central assembly area, and tried to run over as many of this former 
fellow students as he could. He injured nine on his rampage, none 
seriously, killed no one, and then drove off a short distance, parked, dialed 
911 on his cell phone, and calmly told the operator, “Sir, I just hit several 
people with a vehicle….You can come and arrest me now.” Asked why he 
had done this, he replied, “Really, it’s to punish the government of the 
United States for their actions around the world.”316  
c. 2012 Capitol Bomber 
Sidi Mohamed Amine El Khalif, a 29-year old illegal immigrant from Morocco, 
overstated his visa by 12 years. Additionally, he was involved in drugs and had a criminal 
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record. He planned to take down the dome of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, 
DC. El Khalif did not hide his extremist views and used Facebook and other forms of 
social media to express them.317 Moreover, he saw himself as a martyr and was interested 
in his family receiving martyrdom payments after his death.318 Since his parents were 
struggling financially, it is apparent that money was the chief motivator even though El 
Khalif held deep and personal religious beliefs.319  
d. 2015 Chattanooga, Tennessee Military Shooting 
According to CNN, “Mohammad Abdulazeez opened fire on a military recruiting 
center and then drove seven miles away to a Navy reserve facility, where he shot and 
killed four U.S. Marines and a sailor.”320 He was a 24-year-old who was inspired by and 
espoused a jihadist ideology. He graduated from the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga with an engineering degree but failed a background check as part of a job 
requirement to work on a federally owned utility.321 In this case, Abdulazeez shows some 
of the same themes and characteristics discussed above. He was young, educated, and had 
adopted a jihadist ideology. It appears to have acted alone. It is unclear what the 
motivations for the attacks were—if it was directed at individuals in the military because 
of what it represents or because he failed a federal background check and the government 
was the target. He could have been a “frustrated achiever,” whose prospects for a job fell 
through with very little hope. Violence and mass destruction is evident in this attack.322  
e. 2016 Dallas Police Shooting 
The person responsible for the 2016 Dallas shooting was 25-year-old African 
American, Micah Xavier Johnson, who killed five police officers. He had “pledged 
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support to the New Black Panther Party, a group that has advocated violence against 
whites, and Jews in particular.”323 Johnson was considered to be a reclusive. He had had 
no criminal record. He also had a military service record. Reportedly, he “was upset by 
the Black Lives Matter movement, the shootings in Louisiana and Minnesota.”324 In this 
attack, the themes that emerge is that Johnson was young; he adopted a right wing 
ideology, and he appears to have acted alone.  
2. Primary Research Question: Can We Prove It? 
This study sought to answer the following question: Are youth in major U.S. 
metropolitan areas/cities with high rates of disconnection easier targets for ideological 
radicalization than youth in metropolitan areas with lower disconnection rates? As data 
was not available at the metropolitan level, data was substituted at the county level, 
which may be a better area of consideration. The START study did find that “counties 
with a higher proportion of young men aged 15–24 had higher rates of terrorism in the 
1990s and the first decade of the 21st century; however, this variable was not significant 
when included in the multivariate models.”325 Also, the motivations and drivers of 
radicalization are varied and many. Education and employment are not the predominant 
reason for why youth become radicalized to terrorist groups. The issue of “frustrated 
achievers” is one that provides a plausible explanation, but it requires further examination 
and research. It is unclear if relative deprivation as a framework, explain why individuals 
resort to terrorism but it does provide a basis for research to understand which societal 
and environmental factors are most impactful.  
3. Secondary Research Question 
Which societal factors and influencers are the leading causes of radicalization 
among youth in metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection? Even though data 
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was not available at the metropolitan level, data was substituted at the county level, 
which may be a better area of consideration. Based on the research and the analysis of the 
data, there is no one particular set of factors, such as race and religion that can be singled 
out as a leading cause of radicalization. Race and religion do not appear to be factors in 
radicalization. Despite the fact that African American youth are disproportionately 
unemployed, underemployed, and not enrolled in education relative to other racial 
groups, they are no more likely than American youth from other racial groups to be 
radicalized to terrorism. Factors such as language diversity, higher rates of residential 
instability, and high rates of foreign born populations are more closely associated with 
terrorism at the local level. This requires further research.  
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 FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS VI.
This world demands the qualities of youth: not a time of life but a state of 
mind, a temper of the will, a quality of imagination, a predominance of 
courage over timidity, of the appetite for adventure over the love of ease.  
Robert Kennedy 
 
A. FINDINGS: WHAT DID WE LEARN AND WHAT DO WE KNOW 
ABOUT YOUTH DISCONNECTION AND RADICALIZATION 
There is no single theory or definition of radicalization in the literature. 
Individuals, particularly youth, radicalize to terrorism for different reasons and 
motivations. The influencers and root causes of youth radicalization occur on many levels 
and include social, cultural, economic, political, educational causes. This research’s 
primary focus has been young people (ages 16 to 24 who are not employed and not 
enrolled in education) living in metropolitan areas with high rates of disconnection and 
their likelihood of radicalization as compared to youth who live in metropolitan areas 
with lower rates of disconnection. Theories such as relative deprivation, social movement 
theory, social distance theory, consolidated inequality theory, and psychological 
frameworks are outlined to understand the motivations for radicalization. Disconnection 
as an occurrence is explored through the prism of education, unemployment, 
underemployment, and employment to examine root causes as is how they diverge and 
intersect at a macro level. This research confirms the finding from other research studies 
that radicalized youth and individuals and those involved in terrorism do not necessarily 
lack education or come from low income family backgrounds. One of the central themes 
for future research emerging from this research is the concept of “frustrated achiever” 
and how it may affect youth with education and without education in terms of 
radicalization.    
The study confirms previous research on radicalization that how it occurs at the 
individual and group is a highly personal and complex process. Disconnection as a 
framework for understanding how and why youth radicalizes establishes a basis for 
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current actions and strategies. It also provides a basis for further research in this area of 
study. Disconnection has larger impacts than mere lack of education and employment of 
youth. It involves youth disconnecting from families, cultural and psychological 
alienation, lack of political and economic participation, all of which lead to a sense of 
apathy and frustration.  
Disconnection in a larger context could serve as a basis for future research to 
empirically validate the extent to which socioeconomic and social psychological causes 
correlate to terrorist violence as an outcome. Youth are searching for identity, and 
disconnection indicates that they are searching outside of the normal societal structures of 
work and school. In the search for a social identity what they are disconnected from can 
guide them into particular forms of violent behavior and groups. Such hypotheses are 
reserved for future evaluation. However, future research should also focus on the 
dynamic interpersonal struggles youth go through in becoming radicalized to terrorism. 
The at-risk factors associated with youth delinquency (outlined in Table 1) can serve as a 
helpful framework for exploring future research in this regard because this framework 
highlights the interdependence at the individual, family, peer, and school (community) 
domains. The framework offered by these characteristics and variables suggest a possible 
theoretical basis for understanding the factors leading to radicalization. 
The methodology outlined in Chapter V to analyze the data reveals that the issue 
of radicalization is not a problem of “foreign fighters” who are returning from Syria and 
Iraq, it is individuals radicalized in the United States and already living here. The average 
age of those arrested for terrorism-related plots was 29 years, and they were 
overwhelmingly male. Slightly more than 75 percent of those arrested were either U.S.-
born or naturalized citizens. The places or states of residency with the highest percent of 
arrests included New York, Minnesota, Virginia, California, and Florida. Based on the 
number of terrorism-related arrests, the number of terrorism-related incidents or plots is 
also on the rise. Furthermore, the number of terrorism-related attacks over the last two 
years are have become deadlier, as shown by the number of victims wounded and killed 
as well as the terrorists involved in shoot-outs with police and law-enforcement.  
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The research finds that youth in large metropolitan areas with high rates of 
disconnection are at no greater risk of radicalization than young people in large urban 
areas with lower levels of disconnection. Despite what we see and hear reported in the 
media, data shows that that youth are no more or less likely to be radicalized to commit 
political violence. There are no predictive models or frameworks of radicalization or 
terrorism to help inform us who or when individuals are targets or primed for 
radicalization. However, the literature provides rich theoretical frameworks and processes 
for understanding the underlying societal, economic, political, cultural, and 
environmental factors that serve as indicators or root causes regardless if it is the United 
States, Western Europe, Moslem countries, or elsewhere.  
It is clear from the literature that group identity and perceptions of 
marginalization of one’s group can play important roles in radicalization.326 As noted 
earlier, McCauley and Moskalenko consider “political radicalization as change in beliefs, 
feelings, and action toward support and sacrifice for intergroup conflict.”327 Individuals, 
groups, and masses can become radicalized in a number of different ways, but the key 
idea is that all radicalization, other than of a “lone wolf,” entails prior identification with 
a group that views itself in conflict with another group(s).328 For youth who are 
minorities, this may mean their primary identification becomes one that is opposed to 
some group that is perceived to do them and their fellow group members harm or to be 
essentially immoral.329 
In considering radicalization to terrorist groups, when combining insights from 
the existing literature, it appears that a collective anger based on perceived injustices to 
and alienation of one’s group may be a source of radicalization. For example, Fathali 
Moghaddam notes, “rapid globalization has forced disparate cultures into contact with 
one another and is threatening the domination or disappearance of some groups—a 
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cultural version of ‘survival of the fittest.’”330 Moghaddam asserts that it is psychological 
perceptions that guide behavior, and he uses the phrase “perceived deprivation” to 
express the “psychological phenomenon by which an individual feel that he, and his 
fellow members of an ethnic, religious, political or even professional group do not have 
the same advantages as those from other groups.”331 It is this aspect of threat to one’s 
perceived group that leads to radicalization because the deprivation experienced cannot 
continue to run its course. Some form of action is needed, and some consider terrorism as 
the only viable response. These characteristics also align with some of the definitions of 
radicalization discussed above in that terrorists have a grievance. They had a shared set of 
beliefs and based on a collective identity and often see violence as the only viable and 
acceptable option. 
Drawing on Crenshaw’s work and the theories of relative deprivation and social 
mobilization and the empirical findings that most terrorists in the United States are 
middle class and act on behalf of a kindred group, I offer up for future research the 
concept of “representative” radicalism or terrorism to capture the logic of “frustrated 
achievers” and extend the argument that disconnection leads to radicalization. In this 
view, relatively well-connected youth are radicalized act on behalf of their self-identified 
reference group(s)—those who are perceived to be marginalized because of poverty, 
unemployment, discrimination, and lack of economic opportunity. Tunisia is a case in 
point—the country “has a stronger middle class and education system than most of the 
Middle East, and it has a disproportionately high number of individuals joining ISIS.”332 
The Arab Spring in 2011 started in Tunisia when a young male fruit seller immolated 
himself because of his lack of economic opportunity and his disparagement by 
                                                 
330 Ibid.  
331 Holly F. Young, Frederike Zwenk, and Magda Rooze, A Review of the Literature on 
Radicalization; and What It Means for TERRA (Netherlands: TerRa Terrorism and Radicalization, 2013), 
http://www.terra-net.eu/files/publications/20140227160036Literature%20review%20incl% 
20cover%20in%20color.pdf, 16.  
332 Taşpınar, “You Can’t Understand Why People.”  
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authorities.333 That act symbolized the hopelessness and lack of upward mobility many 
young people in the Arab world feel.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations provided below provide an actionable list of options, which 
can serve as a platform for understanding and recognizing the problem of radicalization 
and tackling it at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. Youth today are 
tomorrow’s adults. They hold the key of future success. They have an active role and 
contribution to make from a social, economic, and political standpoint. Denying them 
such an opportunity by not providing them access and resources to education and 
employments impacts their future. This leaves them disconnected, deprived, vulnerable to 
negative influences, and potentially vulnerable to radicalization.  
The recommendations of this thesis are listed not in order of importance but in 
order of action needed for consideration. Focused attention is required to address the 
issue of radicalization of youth and should consist of integration points at various levels 
within the United States. Despite the fact that this study did not find a relationship 
between youth disconnection and radicalization in large metropolitan areas, it does not 
preclude this from becoming an issue in the future. Indeed, future research on “frustrated 
achievers” and representative radicalism may find such a linkage.  
Recommendation 1: Explore ways to engage second-generation Muslim 
youth to be more self-aware of their cultural identities while still being 
Americans and without sacrificing one in lieu of the other.  
The data shows that a significant number of individuals adopted a jihadist 
ideology. More practical research and methods of exploration are needed to assist second 
generation youth to have a healthy disposition and balance between their cultural identity 
and their American identity. These two forms of self-expression are nor competing ones 
but inextricably linked to who they are. The identities of second generation youth are 
very different from their parents’ identities. Moreover, second-generation Muslim youth 
                                                 
333 Filipe R. Campante, and Davin Chor, “Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? 
Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26, no. 2 
(2012): 167–188, doi: 10.1257/jep.26.2.167.  
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often have very little connection (from a cultural or language standpoint) to their parents’ 
birth country. Often, they cannot identify with it. However, second generation youth also 
feel somewhat left out and cannot always fit into the American culture. They may feel 
they are “outsiders,” and this may lead to frustration and alienation, which can result in 
radicalization. Schools, colleges, social, cultural, sports, and welfare organizations should 
be mindful of this and try to bridge this gap to break down any barriers that may cause 
such duality or conflict.   
Recommendation 2: Create, establish, and implement a multipronged 
approach at the city/county (operational level), metropolitan area (tactical 
level), state (strategic level), and the federal government level (ownership 
level) to tackle the issue of radicalization.  
This recommendation underscores the fact that radicalization, but especially youth 
radicalization, requires a fusion of cooperation, effort, and common ground at all levels. 
Local, state, and federal agencies should be pursue and foster a consensus to tackle 
radicalization as a societal issue. Radicalization is as much a local issue as it is a state and 
national issue. A clear understanding among all stakeholders is needed to develop 
fundamental and strategic approaches to tackling the problem. Role clarification by each 
stakeholder should be the basis of this recommended multipronged approached to ensure 
programs, strategies, and guidance is clear and has buy-in from local community leaders 
and key influencers. Part of the multipronged approach is to seek consensus and 
understanding on definitional and usage of terms and concepts. This recommendation 
also calls for law enforcement agencies to receive awareness training in understanding 
the psychological and sociological factors and dynamics that give rise to disconnection 
leading to radicalization.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
It should be stressed that radicalization to terrorism is not just the sole result of 
individuals adopting jihadist ideologies; it is also strongly associated with right wing 
ideologies and nationalist identity groups, as well as left wing groups. The metaphor of 
the United States as a melting pot can be one of its greatest strengths, and every effort 
should be made by policy makers to understand the push and pull factors that lead to 
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radicalization. The common threads among all these groups should be explored, 
especially their appeal and the societal factors leading individuals to such groups.  
Similar to other countries, the United States is not exempt from youth 
radicalization to violent terrorism. The literature confirms that Muslim youth who 
become radicalized do so for various reasons. Some of them are thrill and attention 
seekers, and some are educated and middle-class. Others are uneducated, poor, and 
unemployed, and they see themselves as excluded or forgotten. It is clear that more 
research is needed to understand the relationship between youth identity, discrimination, 
social integration, and radicalism.  
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APPENDIX A. PEOPLE VARIABLES 
Table 10.   People Variables 
Variable Name Description 
person_ID Identifier for the person 
first_name First name of terrorist 
last_name Last name of terrorist 
full_name Full name and last name combined 
Headshot Picture of terrorist 
headshot_credit 
Federal government or law enforcement agency credited 
for the headshot 
Gender Gender of terrorist 
Age Age of terrorist 
terror_plot Terror plot name 
terror_plot_2 Terror plot name 
plot_ID Individual ID assigned to plot 
citizenship_status Citizenship status 
charged_or_deceased Was the terrorist charged or deceased 
year_charged_or_deceased Year the terrorist was charged or deceased 
date_charged Date the terrorist was charged 
state_charged First U.S. state the terrorist was charged 
state_charged_2 Second U.S. state the terrorist was charged 
last_residency_state Last U.S. state of residency of terrorist 
last_residency_country Last country of residency of terrorist 
Gender Gender 
char_awlaki_ties Ties to Anwar al-Awlaki 
char_awlaki_contact Contact with   Anwar al-Awlaki 
char_contact_with_foreign_militant Contact with foreign militants 
char_overseas_military_training Overseas military training received 
char_us_military_experience U.S. military experience 
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Variable Name Description 
char_online_radicalization Online radicalization 
targeted_jews_israel Jews or Israel targeted 




APPENDIX B. TERROR PLOT VARIABLES 
Table 11.   Terror Plot Variables334 
Variable Name Description 
plot_ID Unique terrorism plot identifier 
Name Name of plot or incident 
Description Description of plot or incident 
foreign_attack 
Was the attack foreign or domestic? answer is 
true or false 
victims_wounded Number of victims wounded 
victims_killed Number of victims killed 
Year Year in which attack occurred 
plot_status Plot status: prevented or not prevented 
method_of_prevention Method of prevention 
Ideology Ideology 
legal_1 Legal complaint 1 
legal_2 Legal complaint 2 
legal_3 Legal complaint 3 
legal_4 Legal complaint 4 
legal_5 Legal complaint 5 
legal_6 Legal complaint 6 
array_legal Reference to legal complaint 
source_1 Online source of information 1 
source_2 Online source of information 2 
source_3 Online source of information 3 
source_4 Online source of information 4 
source_5 Online source of information 5 
source_6 Online source of information 6 
array_sources Reference to online source 
id_depreciated Identifier depreciated 
                                                 
334 Adapted from New America, “In Depth.”  
 110 
Variable Name Description 
id_2_depreciated Identifier depreciated _2 
plot_initiation How was the plot initiated 
  
Note: Not all of the variables listed above contained any data.  
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APPENDIX C PROFILE DATA OF TERRORIST ARRESTED 
Table 12.   Breakdown by Age and Gender335 
 
                                                 
335 Source: New America, “In Depth.”  
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Figure 6.  Breakdown by Marital Status336 
 
 
Figure 7.  Breakdown by Citizenship Status337 
 
                                                 
336 Source: New America, “In Depth.”  
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APPENDIX D. YOUTH DISCONNECTION DATA BY STATE 
Table 13.   Youth Disconnection by State338 
Rank State Disconnected Youth (% ages 16–24) 
Disconnected Youth 
(# ages 16–24) 
 
United States 13.8 5,527,000 
1 Nebraska 7.6 18,222 
2 North Dakota 7.9 8,930 
3 Iowa 8.8 34,655 
4 Minnesota 8.9 57,352 
5 Vermont 8.9 7,257 
6 South Dakota 9.4 10,011 
7 Kansas 9.4 35,508 
8 Wisconsin 9.8 68,181 
9 Massachusetts 9.8 84,834 
10 Maine 9.8 14,593 
11 New Hampshire 10.1 16,428 
12 Connecticut 10.6 46,335 
13 Utah 11.2 47,522 
14 Hawaii 11.5 19,470 
15 Colorado 11.5 73,892 
16 Wyoming 11.8 8,860 
17 Maryland 11.8 85,660 
18 New Jersey 12.1 124,877 
19 Ohio 12.3 174,132 
20 Rhode Island 12.4 18,386 
21 Virginia 12.5 129,665 
22 Illinois 12.9 207,984 
23 Montana 12.9 16,613 
                                                 
338 Adapted from Kristen Lewis and Sarah Burd-Sharps, American Human Development Report: The 
Measure of America 2013–2014 (Agoura Hills, CA: Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, 2014), 
http://www.measureofamerica.org/docs/MOA-III-June-18-FINAL.pdf.  
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Rank State Disconnected Youth (% ages 16–24) 
Disconnected Youth 
(# ages 16–24) 
24 Missouri 12.9 96,721 
25 Pennsylvania 13.3 208,813 
26 Indiana 13.4 113,104 
27 Michigan 13.7 173,899 
28 California 13.8 699,150 
29 New York 13.8 343,699 
30 Washington 14.1 118,330 
31 Alaska 14.2 14,829 
32 North Carolina 14.7 182,377 
33 Oregon 14.8 69,090 
34 Texas 14.9 521,061 
35 Idaho 14.9 30,530 
36 Kentucky 15.2 81,850 
37 South Carolina 15.2 94,408 
38 Florida 15.3 348,366 
39 Delaware 15.4 17,055 
40 Oklahoma 15.9 78,557 
41 Georgia 16.5 215,663 
42 Arkansas 16.6 59,976 
43 Tennessee 16.6 132,040 
44 New Mexico 16.9 46,221 
45 Arizona 17.3 146,510 
46 Alabama 17.9 110,955 
47 District of Columbia 18.3 16,782 
48 Nevada 18.5 61,786 
49 Mississippi 18.5 74,119 
50 West Virginia 19.4 41,838 





APPENDIX E. YOUTH DISCONNECTION DATA BY 
METROPOLITAN AREA 














































































































 United States 13.8 5,527,000 21.6 16.3 11.3 


























9.1 41,494 16.6 
 
7.7 









7 Worcester, MA–CT 9.3 11,220   
7.7 










                                                 

































































































































12 Syracuse, NY 10.0 11,207 
  
9.8 
13 Akron, OH 10.1 9,910 
  
10.2 
14 Pittsburgh, PA 10.2 30,575 21.8 
 
9.1 





















10.4 50,593 19.4 12.2 9.2 
19 Toledo, OH 10.7 9,628 
  
7.7 







10.7 20,219 19.9 
  
22 Springfield, MA 11.0 7,932   
11.7 






































































































































27 Austin–Round Rock, TX 11.5 27,959 17.8 14.4 8.8 
28 Urban Honolulu, HI 11.7 14,834    








12.0 17,348 20.3 
 
9.0 
31 San Diego–Carlsbad, CA 12.1 54,278  
13.7 11.0 
32 Salt Lake City, UT 12.2 18,812  
14.8 11.1 
33 Kansas City, MO–KS 12.3 30,795 22.1 12.3 10.1 



















































































































































12.5 147,508 24.5 13.9 7.5 







12.7 222,396 23.2 14.6 9.0 







12.8 29,283 17.6 
 
10.4 
















13.2 35,271 19.4 
 
10.3 
47 Rochester, NY 13.4 21,701 30.8 23.0 9.8 



























































































































13.6 41,236 22.1 15.5 9.5 
51 Cleveland–Elyria, OH 13.6 32,354 24.4 18.3 8.5 
52 Boise City, ID 13.7 12,383 
  
11.1 
53 Harrisburg–Carlisle, PA 13.8 9,168    
54 Winston–Salem, NC 13.9 10,668   
13.0 























































































































































14.5 45,473 19.8 
 
13.0 


























































































































































































75 Stockton–Lodi, CA 15.4 15,032  
15.2 
 
76 Richmond, VA 15.5 26,995 23.8  
10.7 


















80 Jackson, MS 16.2 12,834 16.8 
 
16.0 
81 Tucson, AZ 16.2 23,863 
 
21.6 10.7 
82 Albuquerque, NM 16.7 20,676  
17.0 13.2 
83 Birmingham–Hoover, AL 16.8 26,594 23.9  
12.5 
84 Chattanooga, TN–GA 16.8 12,226   
15.7 




















































































































17.3 95,586 19.1 23.9 11.3 







17.5 109,401 26.0 18.0 16.3 
89 Fresno, CA 17.7 23,955 
 
17.7 16.4 
90 New Orleans–Metairie, LA 18.2 26,234 27.5  
10.5 





































97 Bakersfield, CA 21.2 26,411  
19.9 20.7 
98 Memphis, TN–MS–AR 21.6 44,928 28.6  
13.2 
Note: A blank indicates that the population size of youth ages 16 to 24 in that group and metro 
area is too small for reliable youth disconnection estimates. For Native Americans, the national 
disconnection rate is 20.3 percent. The numbers for individual metropolitan areas are too small 
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for reliable estimates. For Asian Americans, only four metro areas have a sufficient population of 
youth 16 to 24 for disconnection estimates: San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara, CA: 6.0 percent; 
Los Angeles–Long Beach–Anaheim, CA: 6.9 percent; New York–Newark–Jersey City, NY–NJ: 
9.2 percent; Scranton–Wilkes-Barre–Hazleton, PA: 10.7 percent. The national Asian American 
rate is 7.9 percent. Rates have been rounded to one decimal place. The resulting values may 
appear to be tied but the rankings reflect the original values, not the rounded values. 
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APPENDIX F. COUNTIES WITH THE HIGHEST YOUTH 
DISCONNECTION  












1,965 Wade Hampton 
Census Area, Alaska 
37.0 2,000 Todd County, 
South Dakota 
41.7 
1,966 Lee County, 
Arkansas 
37.0 2,001 Telfair County, 
Georgia 
41.8 
1,967 Choctaw County, 
Alabama 
37.0 2,002 Sierra County, 
New Mexico 
41.9 
1,968 Chicot County, 
Arkansas 
37.1 2,003 Dawson County, 
Texas 
42.4 
1,969 Winn Parish, 
Louisiana 
37.3 2,004 Forest County, 
Pennsylvania 
42.5 




1,971 Caldwell County, 
Texas 




1,972 Wolfe County, 
Kentucky 
37.5 2,007 Dodge County, 
Georgia 
43.0 
1,973 Phillips County, 
Arkansas 




1,974 Dillon County, 
South Carolina 




1,975 Bent County, 
Colorado 
37.6 2,010 Noble County, 
Ohio 
43.5 
1,976 Greene County, 
Mississippi 
37.7 2,011 Karnes County, 
Texas 
43.7 
                                                 












1,977 Roosevelt County, 
Montana 




Census Area, Alaska 




1,979 Shannon County, 
South Dakota 
38.0 2,014 Lincoln County, 
Arkansas 
45.1 
1,980 Greene County, 
New York 
38.1 2,015 Emporia city, 
Virginia 
45.8 
1,981 Wilcox County, 
Alabama 






38.3 2,017 Jones County, 
Texas 
46.4 
1,983 Beckham County, 
Oklahoma 
38.3 2,018 Sabine County, 
Texas 
47.2 
1,984 Jefferson County, 
Georgia 




1,985 Morgan County, 
Kentucky 
38.7 2,020 Martin County, 
Kentucky 
47.8 
1,986 Tallahatchie County, 
Mississippi 
38.8 2,021 Wilcox County, 
Georgia 
48.4 
1,987 Madison Parish, 
Louisiana 




1,988 Van Buren County, 
Arkansas 
39.4 2,023 Haskell County, 
Texas 
48.9 
1,989 Crowley County, 
Colorado 
39.5 2,024 Lassen County, 
California 
48.9 
1,990 Hardeman County, 
Tennessee 
40.3 2,025 Childress 
County, Texas 
51.4 
1,991 Greensville County, 
Virginia 
40.4 2,026 Lafayette 
County, Florida 
51.4 
1,992 McCreary County, 
Kentucky 














1,993 Gilchrist County, 
Florida 
40.8 2,028 Clay County, 
Georgia 
53.5 
1,994 Lee County, 
Kentucky 
40.9 2,029 Hamilton 
County, Florida 
53.7 
1,995 Calhoun County, 
Florida 
41.0 2,030 Rolette County, 
North Dakota 
55.0 
1,996 Corson County, 
South Dakota 




1,997 Mitchell County, 
Texas 
41.4 2,032 Lake County, 
Tennessee 
56.1 
1,998 Bracken County, 
Kentucky 
41.4 2,033 Hancock 
County, Georgia 
56.8 
1,999 Lincoln County, 
West Virginia 
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APPENDIX G. COUNTIES WITH THE LOWEST YOUTH 
DISCONNECTION 




















































1 Logan County, 
North Dakota 
0.0 23 Dunn County, 
Wisconsin 
5.0 
1 Cheyenne County, 
Kansas 
0.0 24 Benton County, 
Oregon 
5.0 
1 Deuel County, 
Nebraska 
0.0 25 Charlottesville 
city, Virginia 
5.0 
1 Greeley County, 
Kansas 
0.0 26 St. Croix County, 
Wisconsin 
5.0 
1 Garfield County, 
Montana 
0.0 27 Brazos County, 
Texas 
5.1 
1 McCone County, 
Montana 
0.0 28 Stearns County, 
Minnesota 
5.1 
1 Treasure County, 
Montana 
0.0 29 Washtenaw 
County, Michigan 
5.1 
1 Garfield County, 
Nebraska 
0.0 30 Tippecanoe 
County, Indiana 
5.1 
1 Grant County, 
Nebraska 
0.0 31 Madison County, 
Idaho 
5.3 
1 Wheeler County, 
Nebraska 
0.0 32 Carver County, 
Minnesota 
5.3 
1 Oliver County, 
North Dakota 
0.0 33 Athens County, 
Ohio 
5.3 
1 Slope County, 
North Dakota 
0.0 34 Buffalo County, 
Nebraska 
5.4 
1 Campbell County, 
South Dakota 
0.0 35 McLean County, 
Illinois 
5.4 
1 Story County, Iowa 2.3 36 Dane County, 5.4 
                                                 





















































2 Potter County, 
South Dakota 









4 Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts 
3.1 39 Isabella County, 
Michigan 
5.6 
5 Douglas County, 
Kansas 
3.2 40 Ozaukee County, 
Wisconsin 
5.6 
6 Riley County, 
Kansas 





3.5 42 Cass County, 
North Dakota 
5.7 
8 Pierce County, 
Wisconsin 





3.8 44 Lancaster County, 
Nebraska 
5.9 
10 Harrisonburg city, 
Virginia 
3.9 45 Portage County, 
Wisconsin 
5.9 
11 Johnson County, 
Iowa 
4.0 46 Bristol County, 
Rhode Island 
5.9 
12 Tompkins County, 
New York 
4.0 47 Burleigh County, 
North Dakota 
5.9 
13 Blue Earth County, 
Minnesota 
4.1 48 Greene County, 
Ohio 
5.9 
14 Monroe County, 
Indiana 
4.1 49 Clarke County, 
Georgia 
5.9 
15 Centre County, 
Pennsylvania 
4.2 50 Coles County, 
Illinois 
6.0 
16 Wood County, 
Ohio 
4.2 51 Lafayette County, 
Mississippi 
6.1 
17 Grand Forks 
County, North 
Dakota 






















































18 Orange County, 
North Carolina 
4.4 53 Cheshire County, 
New Hampshire 
6.2 
19 Latah County, 
Idaho 




20 La Crosse County, 
Wisconsin 
4.4 55 Leon County, 
Florida 
6.3 
21 Chittenden County, 
Vermont 
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APPENDIX H. NUMBER OF ARRESTS BY STATE 
Table 17.   Number of Arrests by State342 
Residence State Number of Arrests by State 
Percent of Arrests by 
State Average Age 
Alabama 4 1.1% 25 
Alaska 2 0.6% 36 
Arizona 5 1.4% 37 
Arkansas 1 0.3% 23 
California 31 8.7% 27 
Colorado 3 0.9% 26 
Connecticut 1 0.3% 30 
Delaware 1 0.3% 26 
Florida 28 7.9% 34 
Georgia 3 0.8% 25 
Idaho 1 0.3% 47 
Illinois 18 5.1% 33 
Indiana 1 0.3% 18 
Kansas 4 1.1% 35 
Kentucky 2 0.6% 27 
Louisiana 2 0.6% 
 Maine 1 0.3% 38 
Maryland 6 1.7% 26 
Massachusetts 9 2.5% 26 
Michigan 2 0.6% 25 
Minnesota 38 10.7% 25 
Mississippi 2 0.6% 21 
Missouri 8 2.2% 35 
New Jersey 12 3.4% 24 
New York 58 16.3% 30 
                                                 
342 Adapted from New America, “In Depth.”  
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Residence State Number of Arrests by State 
Percent of Arrests by 
State Average Age 
North Carolina 16 4.5% 25 
Ohio 13 3.7% 30 
Oklahoma 1 0.3% 30 
Oregon 9 2.5% 29 
Pennsylvania 8 2.2% 35 
Rhode Island 1 0.3% 24 
South Carolina 1 0.3% 16 
Tennessee 2 0.6% 29 
Texas 12 3.4% 26 
Virginia 38 10.7% 27 
Washington 9 2.5% 32 
Wisconsin 2 0.6% 29 
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